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COMPETITION REMEDIES IN CONSUMER
MARKETS1
Luke Garrod*
Morten Hviidt
Graham Loomest
tt
Catherine Waddams Price

I. INTRODUCTION
When competition occurs in a market, firms strive to attract
business by meeting the needs of consumers more effectively than their
competitors. This is mutually beneficial to consumers and firms.
Competition provides consumers with low prices, high quality, wide
variety, and innovative products. Firms are rewarded with more
business and higher profits, presuming they provide better goods and
services than their rivals.
To make markets work well, enough consumers have to play an
active role in finding the best deal. Even in a market with many firms,
if consumers stay loyal to just one firm, no firm will feel external
pressure from rivals to perform better. Thus, even though the structure
of a market may demonstrate that there are many potential
competitors, if consumers are not proactive, they will not receive the
full benefits from competition.
Interventions in final consumer markets by policymakers,
This paper is based on a report prepared for the Office of Fair Trading by the ESRC
Centre for Competition Policy (CCP), Report number OFT 994 "Assessing the Effectiveness of
Potential Remedies in Consumer Markets". Comments from colleagues at CCP and well as staff at
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responsibility for any remaining errors.
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commonly termed 'remedies', attempt to assist consumers in playing an
active role in the market and protect consumers from being exploited
by firms. However, without adequate ex ante assessment of remedies,
which draws upon theoretical analysis and lessons from ex post
evaluation of similar interventions, remedies can fail to have the
maximum desired effect. Therefore, the objective of this research is to
summarize the existing economic theory and empirical evidence
underlying a number of remedies in final consumer markets. Its aim is
to identify the benefits and costs of the remedies and the conditions
under which a remedy is likely to have maximum positive impact on a
market; to highlight the gaps in our knowledge; and to propose ways of
filling those gaps.
Given the wide range of possible remedies, we restrict our
attention to those that are of immediate relevance to the work of the
UK consumer and competition agencies, namely the Office of Fair
Trading (OFT) and the Competition Commission (CC), who both
design remedies in situations where markets fail to work well for
consumers.2 Such remedies are normally considered as. part of a market
study (with respect to the OFT) or market investigation reference (with
respect to the CC) and may involve measures to make consumers more
active.' Where appropriate, we have referred to remedies implemented
by the OFT and CC, but we have not attempted to undertake a
comprehensive summary, discussion, or assessment of remedies applied
by these or other agencies.
The paper is structured as follows: Section II discusses why
consumers may initially be inactive in a market. Specifically, we briefly
review the impact of search costs, switching costs, and bounded
rationality and non-standard preferences on consumer behavior and
competition.4 Sections III-V consider the effectiveness of a number of
remedies. Specifically, the sections consider remedies that aim to help
consumers obtain information and make comparisons (Section III);
those that attempt to assist consumers to make informed choices at the
point of sale (Section IV); and remedies to help consumers switch
suppliers (Section V). At the start of each of these Sections we discuss
the implications of the problems that the remedies are attempting to
solve. Section VI considers the impact of interventions in potentially
collusive consumer markets and discusses when collusion is likely to
occur and what the likely effects may be. Conclusions are drawn in
' In market references, Section 131(2Xc) of the Enterprise Act identifies customer conduct as
a potential market feature that has the ability to prevent, restrict, or distort competition.
' Four of the CC's first five market investigations (Extended Warranties on Domestic
Electrical Goods; Store Card Credit Services; Domestic Bulk Liquefied Petroleum Gas; Home
Credit.) were conducted predominantly in final consumer markets and in each case the CC found
an Adverse Effect on Competition (AEC). Many of the remedies imposed were focused on
enabling consumers to be more active.
' For a similar review, see C. Wilson, Some Essays on the Links Between Consumers and
Market Power, (2006) (unpublished Ph.D thesis, University of East Anglia) (on file with author).
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Section VII. In particular, we highlight the gaps in our knowledge.
These gaps become most noticeable in relation to empirical work on the
effects -of the remedies discussed. Accordingly, we further highlight
ways to increase the extent of academic research into the impact of
interventions.
II. THE ROLE OF CONSUMERS AND INTERVENTIONS

When considering the causes and effects of market power,
industrial economists have commonly focused their attention, on
supply-side issues, such as product differentiation, capacity constraints,
collusion, merger, and entry prevention. It has long been recognized,
however, that consumer behavior can also have an enormous affect on
market power.' In recent times, academics and policymakers have
increasingly focused on demand-side issues that can also lead to failures
and inefficiencies in markets.6
To emphasize the part consumers play in activating
competition, let us consider a situation in which two firms in the
market supply homogeneous products with identical marginal costs and
no fixed costs. All consumers are fully informed of the products and
prices and the location of shops. They are free to shop at any firm
without incurring any cost. Under these assumptions, consumers will be
able to shop at the lowest-priced firm. As a result, economic theory
predicts that firms will set prices equal to their marginal cost and
therefore receive zero economic profit in any finite interaction.
The received wisdom is that, in a market with constant
marginal cost, at any price higher than marginal cost each firm has a
unilateral incentive to undercut its rival's price slightly and capture the
whole market. In the presence of fixed costs, any price below marginal
cost would lead to a firm incurring a loss. This phenomenon is known
as the "Bertrand paradox" because it predicts that the presence of two
competing firms is enough to eliminate the market power that a
monopolist usually enjoys. The Bertrand paradox, therefore, is of
particular interest to industrial economists and policymakers because of
the corollary that consumers will receive the full benefits from
competition even where the number of firms is small.7
'George

Stigler, The Economics ofInformation, 69 J. POL. ECON. 3, 2 13-25 (1961).

6 See, e.g., Timothy J. Muris, "The Interface of Competition and Consumer Protection,"

Remarks at the 2 9 th Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy (2002),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/o2103ifordham.pdf; Michael Waterson, The Role
of Consumers in Competition and Competition Policy, 21 INT'L J. OF INDUS. ORG. 129 2003; John
Vickers, "Economics for Consumer Policy," British Academy Keynes Lecture (Oct. 29, 2003),
available at http://www.oft.gov.uklshared-oftlspeeches/speo4o3.pdf;
Louise Sylvan (2004)
Activating Competition: The Consumer - Competition Interface, 12 COMPETITION & CONSUMER
L. J. 191 (2004); and Mark Armstrong, Interactions Between Competition and Consumer Policy,
University College London (Feb. 2oo8).
7 The same insights arise from the literature on contestable markets. See, e.g., WILLIAM J.
BAUMOL, JOHN C. PANZAR, & ROBERT D. WILLIG, CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY

OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (Rev. ed., Harcourt 1988).
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In the absence of information and a willingness to act without
it, consumers simply won't get the full benefits of competition.
Consider the same situation which led to the Bertrand paradox, except,
in this situation, consumers pick a seller at random and refrain from
searching beyond the first firm they encounter. In this scenario, firms
will set prices at the monopoly level. Here, the thinking is that each
firm is not constrained by its rivals, because it will be certain that
consumers who visit their store will buy goods there. Thus, no firm has
a unilateral incentive to lower prices, as it has no hope of attracting
consumers from rivals.
A. Markets With Search Costs'
Put simply, it can be costly (in terms of money, time and effort)
for consumers to gather price and non-price information about goods
and services. For example, in some markets, consumers may incur a
cost to search each additional outlet, to return to a previously visited
outlet, or to become informed about all the products available and the
terms of trade. Such 'search costs' can lead to a situation in which some
consumers are willing to buy a particular good at a certain price even
though the same good may be available elsewhere at a lower price.
Similarly, some consumers are willing to buy this good even though
another good that suits their needs better is available at the same price
in another store.
In an early attempt to model the effects of search costs on a
market, Peter Diamond found that if all consumers have a positive
search cost of any magnitude, there is a unique outcome where all firms
will set prices at the monopoly level and consumers will only search one
firm.9 This result was regarded as surprising enough to give rise to yet
another paradox.
The "Diamond paradox," is best understood by way of example:
consider a situation in which two firms in the market supply
homogeneous products with identical marginal costs and no fixed costs;
all consumers are uninformed of firms' prices, but they are also fully
informed of the products and the various firms' locations; all consumers
face a positive search cost for each additional firm searched, but if they
search a firm, they become informed of that firm's price. Next, assume
that consumers randomly visit the first store. Under these assumptions,
firms set prices at the monopoly level, because if all firms set the same
price below the monopoly level, each firm has an incentive to
unilaterally increase its price by an amount marginally less than
consumers' search costs. This enables firms to charge higher prices to
8

For a comprehensive review of the search cost literature, see M.R. Baye, J. Morgan & P.

Scholten, Information, Search, and Price Dispersion, in HANDBOOK OF ECONOMICS AND
INFORMATION SYSTEMS 323 (Terrence Hendershott ed., 2oo6).
6
9 Peter A. Diamond, A Model of PriceAdjustment, 3 J. OF ECON. THEORY 15 (197').
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their consumers without causing them to search other firms. The
unilateral incentive to increase price persists at any price below the
monopoly level, and only ceases when the monopoly price is reached.
As a result, with no price dispersion in this market, there is no incentive
for consumers to search other stores; therefore, no incentive exists for
firms to cut prices, as they remain unobserved by consumers.
Therefore, the firms will not induce consumers to search.
Relaxing some of these assumptions can modify the extreme
outcome of the Diamond paradox. For example, if some consumers do
not find searching particularly costly, perhaps because they simply
enjoy hunting for bargains, firms will have more of an incentive to
attract them.
A model in this spirit is Carlton and Perloff's tourist-native
interpretation 10 of the Salop and Stiglitz model," where 'natives' go to
the lowest-priced firms, because they have more experience of the
market and know where the low-priced firms are located. 'Tourists,'
however, still shop at random. In the more general versions of the
model, such as Varian 2 or Stahl, 3 firms face conflicting incentives.
Firms have an incentive to set a high price to extract the rents from
tourists, and a low price to attract natives. Given firms' conflicting
incentives, price dispersion can occur in equilibrium where firms select
a price between an upper bound and a lower bound price. The upper
bound price is the monopoly level if tourists shop at random 4 or if
tourists consider the expected marginal benefit and marginal cost of an
additional search and search costs are sufficiently high.' Otherwise, the
upper bound is constrained below the monopoly price if tourists
consider the expected marginal benefit and marginal cost of an
additional search and search costs are sufficiently low. 6 The lower
bound is given by the price where firms are indifferent between
supplying their tourists and attracting natives for certain and setting
the upper bound price to simply supply tourists."
A common feature in theoretical search models is that the
average price in the market falls as the proportion of consumers that
are willing to search the market increases-or, if the cost of searching
decreases. As a result, remedies that aim to make markets with search
10 DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
(4 th ed. Addison Wesley, 2004).
" Steven Salop & Joseph Stiglitz, Bargains and Ripoffs: A Model of Monopolistically
Competitive PriceDispersion, 44 REV. OF ECON. STUD. 493 (1977).
Il Hal R. Varian, A Model of Sales, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 651 (1o8o).
's

Dale 0. Stahl, Oligopolistic Pricing with Sequential Consumer Search, 79 AM. ECON. REV.

700 (1989).
IS

V
Xarian,
supra note 12.
Stahl, supra note 13.

16 Id.

17The pricing equilibrium of this problem is solved by mixed strategies, which, roughly

speaking, resolve the tension between setting high or low prices through the use of probabilities.
While one may have concerns about the stability of mixed strategy equilibria, they have the
desired effect of generating a distribution of prices based upon firms' ex ante best responses.
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costs work well for consumers should focus on these two objectives.
B. Markets With Switching Costs

When consumers have previously purchased a good or service
from a supplier, they may face some cost when changing to a new
supplier, which is not incurred if the consumer remains loyal to his or
her current supplier. While these 'switching costs' can take several
different forms, they all provide firms with a degree of market power,
as consumers have an incentive to continue purchasing the product
from their supplying firm, even in the extreme case where a rival, who
sells an identical product, is known to be slightly cheaper."
The presence of switching costs has two ex post effects that
dampen competition: (i) fewer sales are lost through a marginal
unilateral price increase and (2) fewer sales are gained through a
marginal unilateral price decrease. This provides firms with strong
incentives to set prices above the competitive level. When all consumers
are 'locked-in' (that is, switching costs are large enough to prevent
consumers from switching between firms), firms set prices at the
monopoly level. 9 When consumers are not locked-in, the pricing
equilibrium of this problem is solved by a mixed strategy, resulting in a
price which balances the incentives to increase and decrease price.°
These ex post effects of switching costs can affect ex ante
competition, as firms' current market shares are important
determinants of their future profits. 2 1 For example, consider a twoperiod game where all consumers can initially purchase from any firm
without cost in the first period but all consumers face a switching cost
in the second period. In the second period, firms have some market
power over consumers who they supply in the first period. As a result,
in the first period, firms have an incentive to compete more fiercely for
consumers to increase their market share. This can lead to what is
known as 'bargain-then-rip-off' pricing, where prices are initially low
(sometimes below cost) to attract consumers to the firm, but, in the
future, firms will raise prices as they attempt to exploit their market
power.
Bargain-then-rip-off pricing is less likely to occur when we
msThe switching cost literature has been reviewed in Paul Klemperer, Competition When
Consumers Have Switching Costs: An Overview with Applications to Industrial Organisation,
Macroeconomics and International Trade, 62 REV. OF ECON. STUD. 515 (1995); Office of Fair
Trading, "Switching Costs," Economic Discussion Paper 5, prepared for the Office of Fair Trading
and Dept. of Trade & Indus. by Nat. Econ. Research Assoc., April 2003 [hereinafter Switching
Costs]; Joseph Farrel & Paul Klemperer, Coordinationand Lock-In: Competition with Switching
Costs and Network Effects, in 3 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (Mark Armstrong &
Robert H. Porter eds., North Holland, 2007).
'9

Paul Klemperer, Market with Consumer Switching Costs, 1o2 Q. J. OF ECON. 375 (1987).

20 Yuval Shilony, Mixed Pricingin Oligopoly, 14 J. OF ECON. THEORY 373 (977)" Paul Klemperer, The Competitiveness of Markets with Switching Costs, i8 RAND J. OF
ECON. 138 (1987).
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relax some of the assumptions of the example above. For instance,
consider a situation that lasts longer than two periods. In each period,
a firm can supply consumers they have supplied in the previous period,
who incur switching costs, and consumers who have not been supplied
by any firm, who incur no switching costs. Assume that firms cannot
price discriminate between the two types of consumers and those that
have been supplied in the previous period are locked-in; so a firm
cannot attract another rival's locked-in consumers. Under these
assumptions, in each period, firms face a trade-off between setting high
prices to extract rents from their existing consumers and setting low
prices to attract unattached consumers from whom they may hope to
extract rents in the future. As a result, the level of prices will depend on
the relative weights of these two incentives.
Switching costs can also have an effect on market entry." For
example, entry can be deterred when switching costs are high and an
incumbent has the majority of the consumers locked-in. In this case
entry is deterred because an entrant will have to lower its price
significantly in order to attract at least some consumers away from the
incumbent. 3 Alternatively, when switching costs are low, entry may be
deterred because an incumbent would be fiercely competitive in the
event of entry to try to prevent its consumers from switching to the
entrant. It is also possible that entry can be facilitated. If an incumbent
has a large number of locked-in consumers, but cannot price
discriminate between them and new consumers, who do not have
switching costs, entry can be facilitated. This occurs because the
incumbent may react less aggressively to an entrant as it may be more
profitable to extract the rents from its locked-in customers rather than
competing for unattached consumers.
Given that switching costs can provide firms with market
power, policymakers may wish to intervene in a market in which firms
have managed to impose artificial switching costs upon consumers. In
such situations, interventions that reduce artificial barriers and allow
consumers to switch more easily between firms can make markets work
better for consumers.
C. Markets And Models Of Behavior
The models summarized in previous subsections concerning
search and switching costs, have tended to assume that consumption
decisions result from optimizing behavior by consumers, who have both
the desire and ability to gather information, process it appropriately
and act upon it in their own self-interest. The problems discussed in
22Paul Klemperer, Entry Deterrence in Markets with Switching Costs, 97 ECON. J. 99 (1987).
2'Moreover, consumers that switch will tend to be the ones with lower switching costs.

These consumers are less profitable for the company, as they are likely to switch back to the
incumbent if the entrant attempts to increase its price in the future.
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those models primarily arose from external constraints or costs that
inhibited optimizing behavior and the general principles behind
remedies tend to focus on removing such constraints.
When consumers depart from optimizing behavior they may
behave in ways that make them economically vulnerable, providing
firms with the ability to exploit that behavior.2 4 The departures from
unconstrained optimizing behavior may be summarized under two
non-standard
and
rationality"
bounded
headings:
different
preferences. 6
The notion of bounded rationality, attributable to Herbert
Simon,27 can be summarized as the time and attention a person can
apply to a task is a scarce resource. As a result, people are bounded in
their ability to process, i.e., receive, store, retrieve, and transmit, the
relevant information required to make consistently optimal choices.
Related to this literature is the impact of heuristics on behavior. For
instance, to limit the time, effort, and cognitive resources a person
expends to solve complex decisions, some people may attempt to use
'rules-of-thumb' that simplify 'problems in a way that provides
solutions, which, more often than not, lead to satisfactory, but not
necessarily optimal outcomes. In terms of markets and consumers,
Glenn Ellison suggests that cognitive costs experienced by boundedly
rational consumers might simply be interpreted as search costs. 28 This
involves a reinterpretation of the tourists and natives model from
Section II.A, such that in place of searching for price information is the
processing of existing relevant information. Natives, then, are
consumers with low processing cost, while tourists are consumers high
processing costs. From the results in Section II.A it follows that
cognitive costs can lead to market power when consumers' tasks are
complex to perform.
Some consumer behavior may depart from what is assumed and
expected by optimal decision making, because consumers' underlying
24 It is possible that both consumers and firms depart from optimal behavior, but it is usually
accepted that firms are likely to have more information about and a better understanding of a
market in which they operate as compared to consumers. For instance, competing firms have
much more to gain (and lose) than an individual consumer; firms can employ specialists to analyse
the market more rigorously than consumers can. Moreover, consumer understanding of a market
may be limited if they have minimal experience of a market. As a result, the majority of research
has focused on profit-maximizing firms and consumers that depart to some extent from
optimisation behavior.
Ellison, Bounded Rationality in Industrial Organisation, in ADVANCES IN
2" Glenn
ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 298 (Mathias Dewatripont et al.
eds., Cambridge University Press, 2003) (providing a recent review of the bounded rationality
literature with respect to industrial organisation).
26 For two examples of this literature, see Paul Heidhues & Botond K6szegi, Competition and
Price Variation When Consumers Are Loss Averse, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 1245 (2008); and Julio
Rotemberg, Customer Anger at Price Increases, Changes in the Frequency of Price Adjustment
and Monetary Policy, 52 J. OF MONETARY ECON. 829 (2005).
27 The notion of bounded rationality is attributable to Herbert Simon. See HERBERT SIMON,
MODELS OF MY LIFE (MIT Press, 1996) (reviewing earlier work dating back to the ig5os).
Ellison, supra note 25.
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preferences are structured so that, even if individuals can acquire and
process all of the relevant information, what they prefer and how they
frame the problem is different from the model of optimization. We refer
to this behavior as non-standard preferences. 9 In the current state of
knowledge there is no operational model that is consistently used to
analyze the behavior of people with non-standard preferences." With
respect to markets and consumers, however, three main areas have
been identified where consumer behavior systematically differs from
what is expected by standard preferences.
First, consumers may have limited abilities to anticipate and
correctly predict their future tastes as well as their and others' actions.
Moreover, consumers may also give greater weight to the present and
immediate future relative to the weights given to different points in the
future.31 For example, it has been suggested that people may discount
more heavily between the present and the future than between different
future time periods."2 This can result in a tendency to put off actions
that cost time and effort in the short-run and seem more palatable
when postponed slightly, leading to forms of procrastination which may
have much of the same implications as the existence of search and
switching costs. In addition, people may encode past experience as
snapshots, focusing on high/low points, recalling more vividly the most
recent elements, and act accordingly, rather than remembering the
whole experience and using it as the basis for future choice.
Second, people may behave as if they are 'excessively' risk
averse in some circumstances, while being risk seeking in others,
seemingly evaluating gains and losses asymmetrically relative to the
status quo. In addition, judgments about the likelihood of events,
2 Stefano DellaVigna, Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field, J. OF ECON.
LIT. (forthcoming) (reviewing a substantial and growing body of empirical evidence of people that
exhibit non-standard preferences in the field).
'o Some recent empirical studies, summarized in J.D. Wright, Behavioral Law and
Economics, Paternalism,and Consumer Contracts:An EmpiricalPerspective, 2 N.Y.U. J. OF L. &
LIBERTY 470 (2007), fail to provide empirical support for the non-standard preference models.
" Where consumers do not adequately foresee the cost and benefits of the contract, the
'bargains' may not compensate for later 'rip-offs'. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Ausubel, Adverse
Selection in the Credit Card Market (Univ. of Maryland, Working Paper, 1999), available at
http://www.ausubel.com/creditcard-papers/adverse.pdf. Ausubel analyses a field experiment
undertaken by a credit card company. There were three offers, mailed out at random: the
'standard' offer was to charge 6.9% on balances for the first 6 months and i6% thereafter; the
pre-teaser' offer also charged 16% after the first 6 months but offered 4.9% for those first 6
months; and the 'post-teaser' variant started with 6.9% but offered 14% after the first 6 months.
Given the actual amounts of borrowing observed among those who took up each offer, the postteaser treatment was at least as advantageous as the pre-teaser (relative to the 'standard').
However, the take-up rate for the pre-teaser was about 2.5 times greater than that for the postteaser. One possible explanation of this result is that consumers place excessive weight on the first
6 months, believing that they can take advantage of the attractive initial rate while reducing their
post-6-month borrowing sufficiently to come out ahead; but that they underestimate their capacity
to rein in their borrowing.
32 See David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q. J. OF ECON. 443
(1997); Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Studying Optimal Paternalism, Illustrated by a
Model of Sin Taxes, 93(2) AM. ECON. REV. 186-191 (2003); DellaVigna, S and Malmendier, U
(2004) "Contract Design and Self-Control: Theory and Evidence," Q.J. OF ECON., 119, 353-402.
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especially personal adverse events, may be confounded with and
distorted by the nature of the outcome and may systematically fail to
follow basic 'laws' of statistics.
Third, some individuals are unlikely to attend equally or
'appropriately' to all aspects of a good or service or all facets of a
transaction: they are liable to pay less attention to those aspects or
characteristics which are less visible or salient. For example, they may
neglect various add-ons and extra charges; while at the same time, if
'optional' charges are included, they may not notice that they can opt
out. There may be a tendency to act as if those characteristics which are
more difficult to assess receive too little attention and those which are
easier to assess receive too much. Uncertainties may be neglected or
simplified, probabilities may be found difficult to compute, interest
rates difficult to compound, and so on, with short-cuts vulnerable to
bias.
It is not always easy to draw a sharp distinction between
limitations of judgment and the heuristics and possible errors that may
follow from this and 'genuine' preferences that are configured
differently. It could be that, in the face of the lack of time and ability to
acquire and process all of the relevant information appropriately, many
individuals exhibit the same kinds of heuristics, which then take on the
appearance of some alternative non-standard model. For example, with
respect to the ways in which people handle decisions involving risk, a
number of alternative theories have emerged which relax one or more
of the conventional axioms of rational choice.33 But whether these are
alternative forms of non-standard preferences, or models which
systematize certain subsets of heuristics, is still an open question.
Likewise, with respect to the ways in which people handle
intertemporal decisions, it is not clear whether people actually discount
the future in some non-standard way, or whether their shortcuts and
errors tend to operate as if they follow some alternative system of
discounting.3 4

III. HELPING CONSUMERS OBTAIN INFORMATION AND MAKE
COMPARISONS
The previous section showed that lack of consumer information
can provide firms with a degree of market power, because consumers
may purchase a product even though a rival product is cheaper or suits
their wants better, other things equal. This section discusses the
interventions that are available to increase consumer ability to acquire
the necessary information to make informed purchasing decisions either
"' See generally Chris Starmer, Developments in Non-Expected Utility Theory: The Hunt for
a Descriptive Theory of Choice under Risk, 38 J. OF ECON. LIT. 332 (2000).
"' As in some form of 'hyperbolic' discounting of the kind discussed by O'Donoghue and
Rabin. See Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 32.
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through searching the market effectively or using information provided
by others.
There may be two reasons Why before the point of sale (POS)
consumers find it difficult to identify which firm offers the lowest price
or which firm's product satisfies their wants best. On the one hand,
they may not have the information because they are unaware that there
is something to search for or the costs of searching for it are too high.
On the other hand, they may have the information, but make poor use
of it due to high processing costs; such as where pricing structures and
products are complex to understand. An important aspect is whether
firms have an incentive to provide consumers with the necessary
information, and if they do, whether they have the ability to do so in a
manner which consumers would find credible. Thus, it is not just a
matter of making consumers come to information; instead, the
information could come to the consumer.
Remedies can increase the number of consumers making
informed choices by providing consumers with information about
products, assisting consumers to compare offerings when comparisons
are complex, and reducing the costs of finding the necessary
information. Regulating the information is a less intrusive way of
making a market work well, which may be beneficial to all, including
policymakers, as it uses fewer resources. The best remedy may then be
to help or encourage firms to provide better information.35 There may
indeed be a benefit from requiring firms to communicate with
consumers, as they are likely to do so more effectively than
policymakers as illustrated by Ippolito and Mathios.36 In order to
design a remedy which supports or encourages firms to communicate
directly to consumers requires an appreciation of why firms are not
already doing so. Before considering remedies to increase consumer
search or the efficiency of their information processing, we provide a
brief discussion of when adequate information will not be provided by
the market37 and problems that can occur when this happens. We then
turn to measures that are available to help consumers search the
market and make comparisons include providing information about
" Although regulators must be careful when it comes to the manner in which the information
is provided, since information provision can increase the likelihood of collusion in some situations.
See Section VI for a detailed discussion of the effects of searching and information provision in a
potentially collusive consumer market.
36 See Pauline M. Ippolito & Alan D. Mathios, Information and Advertising: The Case of Fat
Consumption in the United States, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 9 T (1995). They examined changes in
consumption during two regulatory regimes in the US. One regime was characterised by attempts
by government and others to educate the public about links between fats and disease risks. The
other gave firms incentives to provide this education themselves through advertising and labels.
Their main finding was that while consumers responded to information flows throughout the two
periods by reducing their fat consumption, the rate of change of fat consumption was higher in the
second period where the information was provided by the firms.
'7 For an in-depth review of the advertising literature, see Kyle Bagwell, The Economic
Analysis of Advertising, in 3 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (Mark Armstrong &
Robert H. Porter eds., North Holland, 2007).
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quality, standardization of pricing structures (to facilitate comparisons),
and price comparison sites.
A. The Economics of Information Provision
In a competitive market, firms can have incentives to provide
consumers with information about the deal they are offering. For
example, the 'unraveling principle' suggests that firms have an
incentive to provide consumers with complete information about their
products if there are differences between products, which consumers
care about, and firms can make credible statements about their
products. The intuition is that if no firm revealed the relevant
information, consumers would assess all firms as 'average' in terms of
what they offer. Therefore, the firm offering the best terms has an
incentive to disclose its information to consumers in order not to be
considered average. Among any group of firms yet to reveal
information, there is a firm that is 'best among the rest' which is hurt
by being considered one of the rest and which hence also discloses
information. This occurs until there is one firm left (that offers the
worst deal on the market) and consumers infer its quality from the
firm's silence.38
The unraveling principle rests on the assumption that the
truthfulness of revealed information can be verified either directly by
consumers or at least by a trusted third party. As a result, the principle
suggests that a powerful remedy may be to help firms make credible
statements so that they are able to communicate with their consumers.
Although the unraveling principle may not be as effective when some of
the assumptions it is based upon are relaxed,39 there is evidence that the
unraveling principle does exist in reality, but rarely works perfectly.4 °
" Sanford J. Grossman, The InformationalRole of Warranties and Private Disclosure About
Product Markets, 24 J. OF L. AND ECON. 461 (I98i); Paul R. Milgrom, Good News and Bad News:
Representation Theorems and Applications, 12 BELL J. OF ECON. 380 (198i).
" See, e.g., Boyan Jovanovic, Truthful Disclosure of Information, 13 BELL J, OF ECON. 36
(1982); Insuk Cheong & Jeong-Yoo Kim, Costly Information Disclosure in Oligopoly, 52 J. OF
INDUS. ECON. 121 (2004). Both find that information provision is incomplete where disclosure is
costly. See Joseph Farrell, "Price as Signals of Quality," Ph.D. Dissertation, Brasenose College,
Oxford Univ. (I98O). Farrell finds that unraveling may not occur where acquiring information is
costly for the producer. In addition, in Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Price and Advertising
Signals of Product Quality, 94 J. OF POL. EcON., 796, the authors argue that competition is not
generally sufficient to provide decision makers with full information about products if they are
strategically unsophisticated. Lastly, in Steven Shavell, Sharing of Information Priorto Settlement
or Litigation, 2o RAND J. OF ECON. 183 (1989), Shavell highlights the importance of the
credibility of the firms' statements.
'0 Alan D. Mathios, The Impact of Mandatory Disclosure Laws on Product Choices: An
Analysis of the Salad Dressing Market, 43 J.L. & ECON. 651 (2000) studies the impact of
mandatory labelling in the US on salad dressing during the change in the laws governing that food
products must display labels. Mathios finds evidence that there is some, if not perfect, support for
unraveling. In Rosemary Avery, Donald Kenkel, -Dean Lillard, & Alan Mathios, Regulating
Advertisements: The Case of Smoking Cessation Products, 31 J. OF REG. EcON. 185 (2007) analyse
the information provided by firms for smoking cessation products when the products move from
prescription to over-the-counter (OTC) status. As a result, an expert purchaser (the general
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Information about the relative qualities of competing products
can be difficult to gather, as in many cases consumers have to purchase
the product before they can make a full assessment. 41 As firms are often
well informed about the quality level, this gives rise to an information
asymmetry pre-purchase. When consumers cannot verify firms' claims
about their products, fully rational consumers will disregard any
information that is provided." As a result, the unraveling principle fails
to provide consumers with the relevant information.
The ability of consumers to verify the quality of different
products pre-purchase depends upon the characteristics of each
product. Products have traditionally been divided into three separate
categories. The first is search goods where it is easy to assess quality
pre-purchase, so firms can disclose credible information about its
products. The second is experience goods where consumers cannot
verify a product's quality pre-purchase, but it is easy to assess postpurchase. The third is credence goods where consumers are unable to
assess a product's quality before or after purchase. Most goods have a
mixture of these attributes and in reality it is a question about the
nature of this mix. Problems due to information asymmetries are likely
to be insignificant for search goods and experience goods that are
purchased frequently. A search good's quality can be observed by
simple inspection pre-purchase. Previous purchases of an experience
good can improve a consumer's information for subsequent purchases
and help them to decide whether to purchase the same product again or
switch to a different product. Problems for consumers arise in the case
of credence goods or, when they have infrequent interaction with firms,
experience goods.4 3
When firms are better informed than consumers about quality,
practitioner) is no longer involved in the purchasing decision. Advertising should increase when a
product moves to OTC status, because, compared to an expert, consumers (a) require more
information to make a judgement; and (b) are more susceptible to claims. The results show some
evidence for the unraveling principle as OTC status increases advertising. Finally, in Ginger Zhe
Jin, Competition and Disclosure Incentives: An Empirical Study of HMOs, 36 RAND J. OF ECON.
93 (2oo5), the author provides empirical evidence that the unraveling principle does not work for
health maintenance organizations (HMOs) that provide a form of health insurance coverage in the
US. Lack of expertise makes it difficult for patients to assess whether the medical intervention is
appropriate and properly carried out. Due to HMOs consistent low service quality, they began to
be accredited by the National Committee of Quality Assurance (NCQA) in 199i. Controlling for
cost and demand factors, Jin finds that in more competitive markets, HMOs are less likely to
disclose through the NCQA.
4' Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. OF POL. ECON. 311 (1970).
" Information from firms is "cheap talk," as consumers cannot identify which firms are
telling the truth and which are not. See Joseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, Cheap Talk, io J. OF
EcON. PERSPECTIVES 103 (i996).

" In Julia A. Caswell & Eliza M. Mojduszka, Using InformationalLabelling to Influence the
Market for Quality in Food Products, 78 AM. J. OF AGRIc. ECON. 1248 (1996), the authors point
out that labelling and government monitoring can affect how we might classify a product. "For
example, mandatory nutrition labelling makes characteristics such as fat content into search
attributes that can be verified by reading the package label, while government oversight of claims
increases their credibility. Thus labelling policies are intended to improve the quantity, and often
the nature, of quality signalling in markets in order to improve the functioning of markets for
quality attributes." Id. at 1252.
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two types of problems can occur. Either a market may not exist for a
good or service or a market is less efficient than if there is symmetric
information. As an example, consider a used car market, where
salespeople hold private information on which cars are high quality and
which are low quality. Consumers are uncertain of a car's quality until
they have purchased the car, and so both high and low quality cars sell
for the same price. Consequently, for a car of unknown quality,
consumers are willing to pay more than they would for a low quality
car, because it may be high quality but less than they would for a high
quality car, because it may be low quality. A market for high quality
cars may not exist, because a salesperson is willing to sell a low quality
car at a higher price, but is unwilling to sell a high quality car at a
lower price. As a result, rational consumers realize that only low quality
cars will be offered so they will only be willing to pay the value of low
quality cars." If consumers do not have the strategic sophistication to
work out that only low quality products will be produced and believe
information provided by interested parties to some extent, there is a
possibility that consumers will be misled by firms.45
In some cases firms can overcome the problems arising from
asymmetric information. This can occur when producers of high
quality durable goods offer warranties, which low quality producers
would not implement, as they expect consumers will use the warranty
on too many occasions;46 where firms develop a reputation of supplying
high quality goods;47 and where firms are able to signal their product's
! 48
quality through price.
B. Interventions
If firms cannot be relied upon to provide consumers with
relevant, accurate, and credible information, a close substitute may be
to make more use of comparison sites, particularly those that are
internet based. This is considered immediately below. Most sites focus
on price, but they may also contain information about certain aspects of
quality. The beneficial effect of such sites may be negated by firms
creating overly complex or incomparable prices or indeed variants of
4' George A. Akerlof, The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. OF ECON. 488 (1970).
" In Daylian M. Cain, George Loewenstein, & Don A. Moore, The Dirt on Coming Clean:
Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 1 (2oo5),the authors give
an example from psychology where subjects are paid for their ability to estimate the number of
coins in a jar. Subjects only see the jar from a distance, but they can rely on the information of
advisors who can inspect the jar up close. In treatment i,advisors are paid with respect to how
close the subjects' guesses are to the actual amount, but in treatment 2 they are paid with respect
to how high guesses they are. Despite the advisors' incentives being common knowledge, guesses
are on average 28 per cent higher in treatment 2, which suggests that the subjects are influenced
by advisors despite the conflict of interests.
46 Grossman, supra note
38.
47 JEAN TIROLE, THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION (MIT Press, 1988).
4'

Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 39.
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the product. The following sub-sections discuss the potential effects of
various forms of standardization which may facilitate comparisons
whether or not there is a price comparison site in operation.
i. Price Comparison Sites
When information is costly to gather, consumers may not search
exhaustively for the supplier that offers the best terms. Price
comparison sites49 provide consumers with a list of prices for similar
products that are available from multiple firms as well as possible
quality reviews."0 In this case, while consumers have to so some search
and information processing, most of the information is provided for by
a third party. This can lower search costs as consumers can quickly
locate the best deal, which can intensify competition."' These sites can
be operated by a regulatoror a private company, which may or may
not be for-profit, which may affect their credibility." Moreover, a price
comparison site can at the same time increase the amount of
information in the market for firms, increasing the likelihood of tacit
collusion in some markets.5 3
The ability to search the market with a single click of a mouse
radically reduces search costs and intensifies competition. Some
academics believed that the internet would create intense price
competition and the law of one price would prevail.54 Current research
suggests that this belief was optimistic, despite robust evidence that
price comparison sites have lower prices.5 5 A number of explanations
" Price *comparison tables can be Internet-based but need not be. Since the advantages of
being internet-based is evident, including up-to-date information, easy access and assistance by
presenting other information such as shopping guides, third party reviews and consumer reviews,
we focus on Internet-based sites.
5' In Amanda Hollenbacher & David B. Yerger, Third Party Evaluations and Resale Prices
in the US Used Vehicle Market, 8 APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 415 (2ooi), the authors find that a
negative evaluation of a make of a car by a consumer report provided by a third party could have
an adverse effect on the value of at least some classes of second hand cars. According to the
authors, this is the first study to find any such adverse effect, suggesting that even when it comes
to big-ticket items such as cars, consumers may ignore readily available information.
51 Office of Fair Trading, "Credit Card Comparisons," A report by the OFT (Feb. 2oo8),
available at http://www.oft.gov.uklsharedoftlreports/financial-products/oft978.pdf. This report
recommends the FSA to introduce a price comparison site for credit-cards to reduce search costs
for consumers. Research shows that about 70 percent of consumers who have taken a credit card
out in the last three years did not search the market.
52 For example, the Financial Services Authority operates a price comparison table for
financial products, available at http://www.moneymadeclear.fsa.gov.uk/; and there a number of
private firms operating sites for insurance and utility switching; financial products; hotels and
holiday packages; and consumer products, such as laptops, digital cameras and TVs, among
others. Energywatch sponsors a voluntary code for price comparison sites. For more details, see
www.energywatch.org.uk/helpand-advice/sav.ing-money/index.asp
5' For more discussion of the conditions likely to lead to collusion, see Section VI.
J. Yannis Bakos, A StrategicAnalysis of Electronic Marketplaces, 15 MIS Q. 295 (1991).
s In Fiona Scott Morton, Florian Zettelmeyer, & Jorge Silva-Risso, Consumer Information
and Discrimination:Does the Internet Affect the Pricing of New Cars to Women and Minorities?
I QUANTITIVE MARKETING & ECON. 65 (2003), the authors show that consumers pay on average
2.2 per cent less for cars using a referral site, which is a saving of $450 for an average car. In
Jeffrey R. Brown & Austan Goolsbee, Does the Internet Make Markets More Competitive?
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have been offered for the failure of the internet in general and
comparison sites in particular to remove price dispersion. Some of these
failures could in turn be remedied.
Price comparison sites will not eliminate price dispersion in the
market if only some consumers use the facility. Varian5" models an
information clearinghouse, such as a price comparison site, where those
consumers who use the clearinghouse are able to purchase a
homogeneous product from the lowest-priced supplier, but those who
do not, shop at random.5 ' The model shows that increasing the number
of consumers using the information clearinghouse lowers prices, and
prices tend to approach marginal' cost if all consumers use the
information clearinghouse.5 ' Baye and Morgan present a model where
the price comparison site is a profit-maximizer. They show that the
price comparison site can lower prices, but price dispersion will remain
on the sites even if all consumers use the site to shop at the lowestpriced firm.
Trust, however, may matter. Varian, as well as Baye and
Morgan, assume that consumers shop at the lowest-priced firm when
they use an information clearinghouse." Baye, et al, provide evidence
that this is not the case for price comparison sites as they found that
only 13% of consumers on average purchased from the lowest-priced
Evidencefrom the Life Insurance Industry, iio J. OF POL. EcON. 481 (2001), the authors provide
evidence that price comparison sites in the US lowered prices for life insurance by 8-15 per cent
between 1992 and 1997. In Glenn Ellison & Sarah Fisher Ellison, Search, Obfuscation, and Price
Elasticities on the Internet, (MIT Department of Economics, Working Paper 04-27), available at
http://web.mit.edu/gellison/www/search.pdf, the authors show that demand for computer memory
becomes extremely price sensitive when a price comparison site plays a dominant role, but price
dispersion of about 5 per cent remains. See Michael R. Baye, John Morgan, & Patrick Scholten,
Price Dispersionin the Small and in the Large: Evidence from an Internet Price Comparison Site,
52 J. OF INDUS. ECON. 463 (2004) (showing that prices are more dispersed on a price comparison
site when fewer firms list prices. Specifically, average price dispersion between the lowest and
second lowest price is 23 per cent when there are two firms, but this falls to 3.5 per cent when there
are 17.). Michael Smith & Erik Brynjolfsson, Consumer Decision-makingat an Internet Shopbot,
49 J. OF INDUS. ECON. 541 (2oo) (showing that there is 33 per cent ($16.54) price dispersion
between the lowest and the mean price for homogeneous books). Xing Pan, Brian T. Ratchford, &
Venkatesh Shankar, Why Aren't the Prices of the Same Item the Same at Me.com and You.com?
Drivers of Price DispersionAmong e-Tailers, (Univ. of Maryland, Working Paper, 2001) (showing
that suppliers of electronic goods differentiate themselves across shopping convenience, reliability,
product information, shipping fees and pricing policy, but despite controlling for this, price
dispersion is still large). The economic literature of online price dispersion is reviewed by OFT
(2007) "Internet Shopping," An OFT Market Study, June 2007, Annexe F, chapter 5.
V6
Varian,
supra note 12.
'7 This is another version of the tourist-native model; see Section II.A for more discussion.
s OFT (2007) suggests that 47 per cent of consumers have used at least one price comparison
site, but about 20 per cent of consumers do not search other firms' sites when purchasing online.
"9Michael R. Baye & John Morgan, Information Gatekeepers on the Internet and the
Competitiveness of Homogeneous ProductMarkets, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 454 (2ooi). The intuition
is that if the price comparison site is so efficient that there is no price dispersion, the price
comparison site has no informational value and receives no profit, intense competition in the
product market leads to zero profit for subscribing firms, which eliminates the rents the price
comparison site can extract from the firms, and a price comparison site that is extremely efficient
at allowing consumers to shop at the lowest-priced firm is likely to make rivals exit the market to
leave just one firm.
o Varian, supra note 12;Baye & Morgan, supra note 59.
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retailer of electronic products.6 One explanation is that consumers are
unwilling to purchase from the lowest-priced firm if it is an unknown
brand. Trust is important for online consumers as they rely on firms to
provide the product after they have paid for it. Some empirical
evidence of online brand loyalty backs this up." As a result, firms can
differentiate themselves on the quality of their delivery service, as firms
that are reliable can attract consumers who are concerned with the
firms' credibility while still charging a higher price.63 It is possible for
internet retailers to address some of the reputation effects through
consumer assessments included on price comparisons sites. Adding this
extra dimension to a price comparison site increases its informational
content, but also adds complexity for the consumer.
Furthermore, price comparison sites may not cover all firms
within a market.64 As a result, consumers may need to use more than
one price comparison site to increase their chance of finding the firm
that offers the best terms. Consumers may be unwilling to spend time
and effort on checking each firm's offerings even though it can take a
single click of a mouse. They instead focus on the products that are
most prominent. Thus, Brynjolfsson, et al, show that only i6% of
consumers search more than one firm on a price comparison site and as
few as 9% clicked through subsequent search pages. 6 De Vos and
Jansen suggest that consumers spend only ii seconds viewing search
results.66 In addition, Jansen, et al, showed that about 67% of 18,13
users did not search beyond their first enquiry on a major search
engine.6 1 Consumers may overestimate the ability of comparison sites to
61 Michael R. Baye, John Morgan, & Patrick Scholten, Temporal Price Dispersion:Evidence
from an Online ConsumerElectronics Market, 18 J. OF INTERACTIVE MARKETING 101 (2004).
62 Michael R. Baye, John Morgan, & Patrick Scholten, Pricing and Reputation in Online

Consumer Electronics Market, (Indiana University, Working Paper, 2002) estimate that 17 per
cent of online price dispersion for electronic goods can be attributed to brand loyalty. See also
Smith & Brynjolfsson, supra note 55 (finding that consumers use brand as a proxy for retailer
credibility and shipping reliability, so well-known book retailers can maintain a $1.72 price
premium, on average, over lesser known retailers). Michael Baye & John Morgan, Price
Dispersion in the Lab and on the Internet, 35 RAND J. OF ECON. 449 (2004) (showing that as
consumers exhibit more brand loyalty for electronic products price dispersion falls, but the average
and lowest prices increase). Internet Shopping, supra note 55 (finding that consumers are willing to
pay a premium for goods at a 'bricks and clicks' retailer compared to a retailer that is online only,
as this provides more security if the product is faulty). An Online Shopping Report commissioned
by Quidco in 2007 found that one in three consumers go directly to well-known brand's websites
as an alternative to using price comparison sites. See "British consumers wary of price comparison
websites" (27 August, 2007) availableat http://www.bizreport.com.
6 Other reasons for consumers not purchasing from the lowest-priced firm can include
obfuscation strategies by firms, which are aimed at dampening competition and making
comparisons between offerings difficult, and paying for prominence. These are discussed below.
I Baye & Morgan, supra note 59 (showing that profit-maximising price comparison sites
prefer to list only some of the firms in the market, because this generates price dispersion).
65Erik Brynjolfsson, Michael D. Smith, The Great Equalizer? Consumer Choice Behavior at
Internet Shopbots, (MIT Sloan School of Management, Working Paper, No 4208-0i, 2005).
66 De Vos and Jansen, "Visual Attention to Online Search Engine Results," A study by
Market Research Agency De Vos & Jansen in cooperation with full service Search Engine Media
Agency Checkit (2oo),available at http:llwww.checkit.nl/pdf/eyetracking research.pdf.
67 Major Bernard J. Jansen, Amanda Spink, & Tefko Saracevic, Real Life and Real Users: A
Study and Analysis of User Queries on the Web, 36 INFO. PROCESSING & MGMT. 207 (2000).
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deliver the best outcome for them. The OFT estimates that if
consumers use only one of ten price comparison sites, they would have
only a 50% chance of finding the lowest price.68 It also finds that
approximately one million internet shoppers only use one price
comparison site, because they are unaware of the benefits available
from searching other price comparison sites. 69 It is suggested that if
these internet consumers used each price comparison site as effectively
as possible they could gain between £15o and 240 million per annum.

This behavior provides firms with an incentive to pay to be
prominently displayed at the top of the list.". This may lead to
consumers paying more for their products if they expect the products to
be listed in terms of price or quality.7 According to the 2007 Online
Shopping Report commissioned by Quidco, paying for prominence has
lowered consumers' confidence in price comparison sites. 2 One in three
consumers have stopped using them and 47% said they would not use
them again after finding out that results are often biased by which firm
pays the most. As a result, price comparison sites will be more effective
if consumers have the ability to select how the information is ordered. 3
This will make consumers' search tasks easier and limit the incentive
for firms to pay for prominence, which may increase consumer
confidence in price comparison sites and increase usage. Consequently,
consumers should be made aware of the limitations of individual
comparison sites in terms of their coverage of the market and the way
in which the coverage affects their ability to find the best deal.
Consumers 'should also be made aware that independent price
comparison sites, if available, have no incentive to exclude some firms
from the comparison and may be a better resource to use.
It may be that the sites increase the information readily
available to consumers but at the same time have no, or possibly even a
negative effect on the cost of processing this information. The more
complex products become, the more difficult it can be to rank them or
for consumers to select from a wide range of attributes. Firms can
attempt to limit the competitive effects of price comparison sites by
making products more complex. Ellison and Ellison show that
suppliers of CPUs and memory upgrades have adapted to intense price
competition through a price comparison site by introducing obfuscation
strategies that prevent consumers from searching the market as
effectively as they would otherwise. 4 There is evidence that firms
' Internet Shopping, supra note 5569

Id.

7oId. (finding that 14 percent of Internet retailers pay to have their products featured more
prominently on price comparison sites).
" Id. (suggesting 61 percent of internet users were aware that firms pay to be included and
5o per cent were aware that price comparison sites. placed a retailer higher in the list if it paid.
Even if consumers are aware it is not always likely that they will take account of this).
'2 See supra note 63.
7'Id. (finding that this is possible on 50 per cent of price comparison sites).
7' Ellison & Ellison, supra note 55, at 450.
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create multiple versions of similar products thereby complicating
consumers' understanding of a product's quality to such an extent that
consumers find it difficult to understand what is on offer, and which
products should be compared. In addition, Ellison and Ellison suggest
that the internet retailers use 'bait and switch' strategies in that they
offer low priced and low quality products on the price comparison site
to attract consumers to their webpage, but then are able to sell more
medium and high quality goods with higher margins.15 Consumers may
use price comparison sites to find the lowest-priced firms and then
search within these sites to find a product that better fits their
preferences. However, there is no guarantee that the retailer is the
lowest-priced provider for this preferred product.
Price comparison sites can lead to lower search costs and lower
prices. This mechanism is most likely to be beneficial to consumers
when they have access to the sites; are aware of the sites; firms do not
pay for prominence or offer commissions which can bias recommended
rankings; consumers have the ability to rank items that are compared;
firms do not spuriously differentiate products that are compared;
consumers use more than one price comparison site; consumers are
made aware of the range of products covered and use sufficient sites to
cover the market; and the price comparison site is independent and not
for profit (but well advertised). 6
ii. Standardization of Pricing Information
Comparisons of prices may be hampered by the way in which
prices are presented or calculated. A level of standardization is essential
for comparison sites to function. More generally, some degree of
standardization of prices can make consumer choices easier, as it
reduces the number of dimensions that consumers need to consider in
order to find the best deal. Standardization reduces computational costs
for the consumer, thereby enabling more consumers to make
comparisons, and to improve their accuracy, leaving consumers better
informed at the POS. Standardization may simply involve insisting on a
standard unit of measurement on a price label or the entire pricing
structure. Alternatively, it may involve creating a single, common,
measure to aggregate the different elements of the overall price; or it
may restrict the way in which prices can be presented to consumers.
There is some empirical evidence that when time, effort, and
cognitive resources are scarce, some consumers may make sub-optimal
choices between offerings. Wilson and Waddams Price provide
evidence of the benefit of consumers' switching decisions in the UK

75 Id.
7' There is robust theoretical analysis and empirical evidence of this intervention's potential

effects.
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retail electricity market.77 Focusing on only those people that stated
price as the sole reason for switching, they found that: (i) only 8-19% of
consumers selected the cheapest supplier, which is just higher than the
expected level (7-I4%) if they selected a firm at random; (ii) switchers
appropriated between 28-5 1% of the gains available, which means they
are better off by £16-22 per year, on average; and (iii) 20-32% of
consumers selected a more expensive supplier, losing £14-35, on
average, per year. The authors argue that consumers' ability to select a
cheaper firm is impaired by the difficulty of comparing firms' complex
non-linear tariffs.
Standardizing the units of measurement, such as price per unit,
allow consumers to make simple choices between products when firms
attempt to cater to heterogeneous preferences by bundling their
products in different sizes. Such an intervention is very common. For
example, in the UK, firms are required to provide standard price
comparisons by the Consumer Protection Act 1987. Standard price
comparisons do not always arise naturally from competition; and are
particularly unlikely to do so when products are complex and there is
no obvious comparison that captures the total cost of the product. As a
result, it may be necessary for policymakers to create a standard that
can be compared.
An example of this is the annual percentage rate (APR) of
charge for credit.7" The APR is a measure of the overall cost of credit
expressed as an annual percentage rate. This allows consumers to
consider the cost of credit across products, whatever rate or method of
charging is used by different lenders. Although APR simplifies
comparisons, the OFT warns that it is unlikely to capture all
information the consumer needs to consider when choosing the best
deal for credit.79 Research conducted by Which? in 2007'0 found that
APR for credit cards does not provide consumers -with an adequate
like-for-like comparison, because the top 20 credit card providers use 12
different methods to apply interest charges to their customers'
accounts. This illustrates the difficulty in creating a single measure of
the actual cost (price) of a complex product. As a further remedy, the
OFT recommended an introduction of an independent credit card price
comparison site run by the FSA. 1
" Chris M. Wilson & Catherine Waddams Price, Do Consumers Switch to the Best
Supplier?, (CCP Working Paper 07-6, July 2007), available at http://www.uea.ac.uk/polopolyfs/
I.IO4586!ccpo7-6.pdf.
,"APR was introduced in the UK in The Total Charge for Credit Regulations, made under
Section 20 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974.
71OFT (2004) "Credit card survey," Prepared for the OFT by FDS International Ltd. "For
example, the deal with a lower APR might require monthly payments the borrower cannot afford,
or run for much longer than the borrower wants or than the goods bought with the credit are likely
to last, or the goods might be cheaper from another store, making that a better deal even though
the credit charges are higher."
' Which?, Press Release, "Which? launches super-complaint on credit card interest charges,"
April 1, 2007, available at http://www.which.co.uk.
"' Credit Card Comparisons, supra note 51.
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While standardization of prices may assist consumers in
comparing between offerings, this may not always be translated into
lower prices, as the introduction of the Euro has illustrated.. Here the
standardization is not in terms of the unit of measurement but the unit
of currency. In 2002 the Euro standardized currencies across 12
European countries, which had the potential to improve consumers'
ability to make comparisons across participating nations, as they do not
2
have to calculate prices in terms of their own currency. Baye, et al,1
provide empirical evidence that online prices in the Euro Zone
increased compared to prices outside the Euro Zone, despite the
widespread belief that standardization would intensify competition and
lower prices. Baye, et al, further argue that standardization caused
higher prices because it became more profitable for firms to set prices to
extract rents from their captive consumers rather than competing for
consumers that searched the market.8 3 For example, standardization
enables consumers to compare products of a greater number of firms, as
they become aware of firms that they did not previously consider.
When this occurs and firms can supply loyal consumers who purchase
from the firm, and non-loyal consumers, who search for the lowestpriced firm, there are two effects: (i) a 'business stealing' effect which
means firms are willing to set lower prices; and (ii) a 'surplus
appropriation' effect which means that firms are more likely to set high
prices to extract rents from loyal consumers, because they are less likely
to attract non-loyal consumers after the number of competitors has
increased. 4 As a result, prices may increase if the surplus appropriation
effect outweighs the business stealing effect.
Consumers can find comparisons difficult when firms separate
prices into different cost components, which can lead to some
consumers being inattentive to less salient parts of the price; and
comparisons require more than one characteristic to be compared, such
as a price-quantity comparison and the total cost to the consumer
depends upon usage, such as non-linear tariffs.8" The corresponding
remedies are to require firms to advertise a common headline price or a
standard pricing comparison. 6
82 Michael R. Baye, et al., Did the Euro Foster Online Price Competition? Evidence from an

InternationalPrice Comparison Site, 44 ECON. INQUIRY 265 (2006).
83 Id. An alternative explanation is that uninformed consumers become aware of what other
people are charged preventing the firms from giving preferential treatment to informed consumers.
See Morten Hviid & Peter M0llgaard, Countervailing Power and Price Transparency, 1o8
SCANDINAVIAN J. OF ECON. 499 (2oo6).
8 Marten C.w. Janssen & Jos6 Luis Moraga-Gonz.lez, Strategic Pricing,Consumer Search
and the Number of Firms, 71 REV. OF ECON. STUD. lO89 (2004).
85 The total cost of a non-linear tariff is given by a flat rate, which is paid per period, and
variable rates, which are dependent upon how much is used.
86 A common headline price includes setting all-inclusive prices rather than separating the
cost of add-ons and extra fees from a base line price. A standard pricing comparison requires firms
to advertise an average price that captures the total cost of the product. Standardisation of price
comparisons may make it easier for firms to observe each other's pricing strategies. In some
situations, this may lead to tacit collusion. For more discussion of collusion, see Section VI.
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Pricing strategies that separate baseline prices from other
associated costs have long been standard parts of the marketing toolkit.
If consumers are aware of each part of the components that make up
the total cost, the price of each component can be driven down without
detriment to consumers. However, when some parts of price are more
prominent than others, consumers may neglect or place less emphasis
on some of the components that make up the total price. Chetty, et al, 7
show that consumers' inattention to taxes not included in the headline
price is substantial in the US. First, they conduct a field experiment
where tax-inclusive prices are posted for 750 products over a threeweek period (where prices are usually posted exclusive of tax). They
find that demand for these products falls by 8.8% compared to control
products and nearby control stores, as tax-inclusive prices appear to be
higher. Second, they find that alcohol consumption is more sensitive to
a tax increase when it is included in the headline price as opposed to
when it is added upon purchase. Hossain and Morgan" find evidence
that consumers are inattentive to postage and packaging charges in a
series of field experiments on an auction website. It is common practice
for distance sellers to separate a product's total price into the price for
the item itself and the price for postage and packaging. If consumers
were fully aware of the total price, it would not matter how the price is
divided, as only the total price matters. It is found that starting an
auction for a CD at a lower opening price and charging a higher
shipping cost leads to earlier bidding, more total bids, and a 21% higher
final price." Separating prices into cost components can be detrimental
to inattentive consumers as they may visit a store, which they believe to
be the cheapest, but can be charged more in extra fees once the
consumer is at the point of sale.9 ° For example, the OFT 91 finds that
some internet retailers defer unavoidable extra charges until the end of
when consumers are committed to buying the
the transaction,
92
product.
A remedy that requires all associated costs to be brought
together so that consumers are presented with a single all-inclusive
price can resolve consumers' inattention to price components. There is
some theoretical evidence which suggests that this type of remedy can

17 Raj Chetty, Adam Looney, & Kory Kroft, Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence,
(NBER, Working Paper No. 13330, Aug. 2007).
" Tanjim Hossain & John Morgan, ... Plus Shipping and Handling: Revenue (Non)
Equivalence in Field Experiments on eBay, 6 ADVANCES IN ECON. ANALYSIS & POL'Y 2[3].
Article 3

89 Id.
'0 See Section IV for a detailed discussion of the effects of a point of sale advantage.
" Internet Shopping, supra note 55.
92 OFT (2oo8a) "Web sweep analysis," a report by the OFT finds that 40 percent of 400 UKbased retailers whose websites were examined did not indicate that compulsory charges would be
added when price was first shown. It is estimated that such unexpected charges costs consumers
between £50-85 per unaware online consumer per annum, which amounts to between £6o-ioo
million per annum.
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lower prices. 93 This remedy was used in the European airline industry
when in 2006 the European Commission passed regulations that
require airlines to quote online prices inclusive of taxes, fees and
charges (TFCs) to prevent them from misleading consumers.9 4 The Air
Transport Users Council (AUC) believed that airlines used low base
prices on their websites to attract consumers who were unaware that
advertised prices did not include firm-specific TFCs until they were set
on purchasing the flights.9" Requiring firms to set an all-inclusive price
is easy to implement when the extra fees are unavoidable and paid by
all consumers. It may be more difficult for firms to show the true cost of
a product when it varies from one consumer to another, because of
complementary purchases or difference in usage.
A remedy that implements a standard comparison can lead to
easier cbmparisons and more people making informed choices. Such an
intervention is most likely to be beneficial to consumers when the
measure simplifies comparisons, consumers shop around and will use
the comparison, and the comparison does not neglect important
information.96 A remedy requiring firms to set an all-inclusive price is
easy to implement when the extra fees are unavoidable and equal for all
consumers. It may be more difficult for firms to show the true cost of a
product when it varies from one consumer to another because of
complementary purchases or difference in usage.
iii. Providing Information About Quality
Price is not the only factor in a consumer's purchasing decision.
To make an informed decision, consumers typically require information
about the characteristics of the products to assess whether it meets their
requirements. Often this is summarized as the "quality" of the product,
Remedies can include information provision about quality levels.
Providing consumers with the ability to assess quality prepurchase can enable consumers to make informed choices and increase
the average level of quality in the market. If consumers are not aware
of the terms and conditions of purchasing a product before they buy,
they will be unable to assess the 'quality' until post-purchase, when
consumers may need to seek redress. As a result, the lack of awareness
about terms and conditions can mean that a product becomes an
11See Luke Garrod, Price Transparency and Consumer Naivety in a Competitive Market,
(CCP Working Paper 07-IO, Apr. 2oo8). For a more general discussion of price transparency see
Elisabetta lossa, Modelling Changes To Consumer Welfare Caused By Reduced Price
Transparency(FSA Occasional Paper 26, Aug. 2007).
See European Commission Press Release, "More competition and better quality: European
Commission wants to strengthen the Single Market for Aviation," July i8, 2006, available at:
http://europa.eu/indexen.htm.
'5 AUC Report, "Taxes, Fees and Charges: An AUC Report on Pricing on Airlines'
Websites," (2005), available at www.auc.org.uk.
96 There is limited theoretical analysis and empirical evidence of this intervention's potential
effects and this is an area where more research is needed.
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experience good, despite many other quality attributes being verifiable
pre-purchase. Externally enforced rules on information provision about
quality can enable or require firms to disclose a product's quality or
some closely related information to act as a proxy." Such information
can be provided with a product, on a product's packaging, in a firm's
store window, or on a website.
There is empirical evidence that providing information on
quality can have beneficial effects. For example, Jin and Leslie98 study
the effect of an increase in quality information of restaurants in Los
Angeles between 1996 and 1998. The Los Angeles County government
passed an ordinance that required restaurants to display a letter-grade
card (A, B or C) prominently in their window corresponding to the
result of their most recent Department of Health Services hygiene
inspection. Before grade cards were introduced firms' revenues were
insensitive to changes in hygiene scores. After the regulation, an "A"
grade (the best) increases revenue by 5% compared to a "B" grade
(second best), on average. There is also evidence that health inspection
scores increase over the period and food borne illness hospitalizations
their
decreased by 20%, which implies that restaurants increased
99
quality due to grade cards. The effect upon price is unknown.
For quality information to have such an effect, consumers must
be willing and able to process the information. Carlton and Perloff' °
argue that a "sensible" consumer would process information up to the
point where the marginal benefit of processing the information equals
the marginal cost. This implies that some consumers may not make use
of all of the available information," °' other things being equal, when the
information is complex and extremely costly to understand and the
expected benefit of.processing the information is limited. Consequently,
consumers are likely to be uninformed about products that are complex
and difficult to understand or products that are less expensive, other
things being equal. 112 With this in mind, information provision is going
7 Actual information can be provided for the nutritional content on food, for example. But
information about the quality of a meal in a restaurant can be more difficult to provide, but past
quality may be a good proxy of present quality. Generally, actual information can be provided for
goods, but this is more difficult for services.
"' Ginger Zhe Jin & Phillip Leslie, The Effect of Information on Product Quality: Evidence
from RestaurantHygiene Grade Cards, i18 Q. J. OF ECON. 409 (2003).
" In Tasneem Chipty & Ann Dryden Witte, Effects of Information Provision in an Vertically
Differentiated Market, (NBER Working Paper No W6493, Apr. 1998), the authors study the
effects of information provision in the childcare industry. They find that providing information
about quality intensifies competition. The BRE and NCC Report (2007) "Warning: Too Much
Information Can Harm," an interim report by the Better Regulation Executive and National
Consumer Council also found evidence in their focus groups that consumers believed that this
form of 'scores on the doors' would be helpful to consumers in the UK when considering food
hygiene inspection information.
'0o MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note io.
10' To be sure, a fully rational consumer that has no cost of processing information would
process all information. A boundedly rational consumer that faces costs of processing information
may decide not to use all information that is available.
"02Products that are more expensive can be more complex to understand; so, information
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to be most effective when it lowers the costs of consumers processing
the information for expensive products. This would be the case where
in the absence of the remedy, firms are unable or unwilling to provide
consumers with the information in an adequate format.
Provision of quality information may also not be as effective
when quality can vary along a continuous scale, but available
information only distinguishes between high and low quality. In this
situation, firms will only have an incentive to produce the minimum
quality to get into each quality bracket. Thus, the inability to provide
precise information can reduce the number of quality variants provided
in the market. In addition, it may be difficult or inadequate to simplify
some information. For example, when there is a large amount of
information to be processed, such as information on terms and
conditions of complex products, reducing the quantity may limit the
usefulness of the terms and conditions because the devil is in the detail.
When a product's actual quality is difficult to measure, past
quality of the product or service can be used if it is a good proxy for
present quality. Firms may have an incentive to free ride on a high
quality score (given by past performance) by selling or producing low
quality to reduce costs in the present. Firms may try to influence their
quality ratings in other ways. Dranove, et al, 103 analyze the impact of
publicly reporting the physician and hospital mortality rates for
coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgeries. The study concludes
that New York and Pennsylvania hospitals began to avoid operating on
unhealthy patients, who spent large amounts on hospital bills in the
year before their surgeries, to limit the likelihood of affecting their
mortality rates negatively. The authors noted that this is only a shortterm effect, and that the long-term effect is unknown.
An alternative to information provision is to impose minimum
standard requirements. These place a lower bound on the quality of
goods or services within a market. Compared to providing information,
this type of restriction also increases the average quality in the market,
but the significant difference is that the variety of products within the
market can be reduced. Any increase in product quality required to
adhere to a minimum standard is likely to raise firms' costs and the
prices faced by consumers. Consumers who prefer to purchase products
with quality below the minimum requirement at lower.prices will be
denied the opportunity to do so. The welfare effects of such a policy are
dependent upon whether the increased quality or higher prices
dominate."' ° This type of quality standardization also has the potential
provision for these types of products will be especially effective, as consumers have more to benefit
from making informed choices.
103 Daniel Dranove et al., Is More Information Better? The Effects of 'Report Cards' on
Health Care Providers, s is J. OF POL. ECON. 555 (2003).
1"4 Hayne Ellis Leland, Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality'
Standards, 87 J. OF POL. ECON. 1328 (1979); Hayne Ellis Leland, Minimum Quality Standards in
Markets with Asymmetric Information, in OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE (Washington DC:
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to increase barriers to entry for potential new firms. Given that firms
must invest in high quality technology they are more likely to be put off
by the higher (marginal and sunk) costs. Carlton and Perloff' °5 argue
that r6strictions upon quality may also prevent new innovative
products entering the market. They discuss how US model plumbing
and building codes required pipes to be made out of copper. As a result,
manufacturers that produced plastic pipes, which were less costly to
produce and could be installed more quickly by a less skilled laborer,
were restricted from entering the market. 106
iv. Regulating Non-Price Dimensions of Products
When consumers are not adept at choosing between complex
offerings, firms may have an incentive to make consumer tasks more
difficult. Spiegler °7 analyses a theoretical model where consumers use
heuristics to overcome their inability to understand a product's
multiple characteristics. He finds that firms respond to an increase in
the number of competitors by spuriously increasing the complexity of
their product, which can be detrimental to consumers as they become
poorer at selecting a good deal, so competition is less intense.
Before designing a remedy, it is worth considering whether
competition among firms may come to the rescue of consumers.
Gaudeul and Sugden'0 5 argue that in theory firms may not be able to
increase the complexity of consumers' decision problems if there is a
common standard, which simplifies comparisons and is taken as a
signal that the product offers value for money. Because of beliefs,
competition may force firms to use common standards and set
competitive prices, even if consumers are liable to make sub-optimal
choices when faced with non-common standard comparisons. Although
this is a plausible argument, the results of the theory depend upon there
being a common standard across products and that consumers
recognize when comparisons are standard and when not.
Where competition fails to reduce complexity, policymakers can
for example assist consumers to make comparisons by restricting firms
to package products in a standardized way. This can help consumers
pick the best deal, because the number of dimensions a consumer has to
consider is reduced. °9 Restricting product attributes can limit product

American Enterprise Institute, i979).
10SMODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note io.
'o It is generally claimed that the plumbing union supported the restrictive codes to increase
demand for their trade.
117Ran Spiegler, Competition over Agents with Boundedly Rational Expectations, i

THEORETICAL ECON. 207 (2oo6).

"~'Alexis Gaudeul & Robert Sugden, Spurious Complexity and Common Standards in
Marketsfor Consumer Goods, (CCP Working Paper 07-2o, Nov. 2007).

"o This remedy has the potential to lead to tacit collusion, because it restricts the dimensions
that firms can compete on. See Section VI for more details.
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differentiation and increase competition."' However, the benefits of
lower prices come at the cost of limited product variety, as consumers
may be less able to purchase a good or service that satisfies their wants
and needs."'
Evidence from psychology suggests that people can be harmed
by 'too much' choice. It is argued that a great variety complicates
decisions and so people avoid making choices altogether, even when
there are acceptable options available ('choice avoidance')." 2 Choice
avoidance could be driven by high cognitive costs of selecting a deal
which is the best. When a consumer cannot work out which deal is best
they may decide to procrastinate on the decision, even when they know
there are gains to be made, because they believe (rightly or wrongly)
that they will be able to find which deal is best in the near future. The
evidence on choice avoidance suggests that some consumers may not
always be harmed by a reduced variety in the market.
At the present it is unknown in which situations consumers will
avoid making choices. Intuitively, it seems possible that some
consumers may avoid making choices when they have limited and
infrequent experience in a market, as choices will become less complex
as they are made more often; the benefits from making a choice are
realized in the future, so the incentive to make a choice is reduced; and
they have a rolling-contract of supply of a good or service, as it is not
necessary for the consumer to make a choice." 3
...Michael Waterson, Models of Product Differentiation,41 BULL. OF ECON. RES. I (1989).
. For example, a remedy that requires firms to set a two-part tariff that has the same flat
rate simplifies comparisons, as consumers only need to compare variable rates to work out which
firm is cheaper. This is likely to intensify competition. However, high-usage consumers will prefer
a higher flat rate and a lower variable rate compared to low-usage households. As a result, this
remedy would restrict the ability of some consumers to get a deal that suits them. To the extent
that there are cost differences in supplying the two groups the remedy would also make prices less
cost reflective.
.. There is some empirical evidence of 'choice avoidance.' In Sheeyna S. Iyengar & Mark R.
Lepper, When Choice is Demotivating: Can One Desire Too Much of a Good Thing?, 79 J. OF
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 995 (2000), the authors provided consumers with the opportunity
to taste a number of jams in a grocery store before purchase. Consumers were offered six varieties
of jams in treatment i, and 24 in treatment 2. There is evidence that when more jams were on
offer, more consumers sampled the jam, but significantly fewer consumers purchased the jam.
Moreover, Sheena S. Iyengar, Wei Jang & Gur Huberman, How Much Choice Is Too Much?
Determinants of Individual Contributions in 4o(k) Retirement Plans, in DEVELOPMENTS IN
DECISION-MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: IMPLICATIONS FOR RETIREMENT PLAN DESIGN AND
PLAN SPONSORS (Olivia S. Mitchell & Stephen P. Utkus eds., Oxford University Press,
forthcoming) presents evidence from the US that the participation rates of 40i(k) (pension) plans
increase when individuals have fewer options to invest in. James J. Choi et al., For Better or For
Worse: Default Effects and 4o1(k) Savings Behaviour, in PERSPECTIVES IN THE EcONoACS OF
AGING 81 (David A. Wise ed., Univ. of Chicago Press, 2004) shows that participation rates of
40(k) plans increase if non-participating members are sent a reminder with only one option.
While Marianne Bertrand, Sendhil Mullainathan, & Eldar Shafir, Behavioral Economics and
Marketing in Aid of Decision Making Among the Poor, 25 J. OF PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 8
(2oo6) analyzes the take up of 5o,ooo mailed loan offers in South Africa. They show that when the
advertisement only lists one loan option example, significantly more people take-up loans than
compared to an advertisement, which has four examples. The effect is equivalent to reducing the
monthly interest rate by€ 2.3 percentage points.
"' Requiring firms to send annual renewal notices may prompt consumers into making
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Limiting product differentiation can lead to easier comparisons
for consumers, more intense price competition and reduced choice and
variety to satisfy consumers' needs. This intervention is most likely to
be beneficial to consumers when product differentiation is spurious and
variety makes consumers' decisions difficult (relative to benefit from
1 14
choice).
C. Summary
Where consumers find price and non-price information costly to
gather and possibly difficult to process, they may not be as active in a
market as is necessary for them to get the best deal. When this occurs
policymakers can implement interventions that either increase the
information easily available or attempt to eliminate or overcome the
obstructions that consumers face when searching the market. Examples
of such interventions are establishing price comparison sites,
standardizing prices and quality. Such interventions are not always
necessary as in some cases firms have already got incentives to provide
consumers with relevant information. They may be unable to do so
effectively and hence there may still be scope for interventions that help
firms make credible statements. Examples of such interventions are
certification of claims and regulation of untruthful or misleading
statements.
Consumers can find it difficult to choose the best deal when
they are faced with a choice between several complex products or
pricing structures. An intervention that attempts to resolve the
complexity of the task by limiting the choice available to consumers can
reduce the likelihood that consumers will find a product to best suited
to their wants and needs. Therefore, less intrusive interventions that
aim to assist consumers to make informed decisions without affecting
the choice available in the market may be superior in the majority of
cases.
Design of a remedy must take account of the sophistication of
consumers and their access to information. It is not enough that the
information is available to consumers; they must also be willing and
able to act upon it. When consumers find information costly to process
they may misunderstand the message or choose to ignore much of the
information provided. As a result, interventions that attempt to
increase the ability of consumers to make informed choices will be most
effective when the information is simple and easy for consumers to
grasp. In addition, information requirements should not be overly
prescriptive, preventing firms from communicating with consumers
choices. In effect such a remedy would aim to increase the consumers' perceived cost of
procrastination. Whether such costs should be included in the assessment of the remedy is an open
question.
14 There is robust theoretical analysis on this intervention, but no empirical evidence.
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effectively. The effectiveness of the interventions will be enhanced if
the interests of firms can be aligned with those of policymakers.
IV. HELPING CONSUMERS MAKE INFORMED CHOICES AT THE POINT
OF SALE
This Section discusses the interventions that are available to
prevent consumers from making uninformed decisions at the point of
sale (POS) and those that allow consumers to correct such decisions
post-POS. The POS is the location at which consumers purchase goods
and services. This can include a supplier's bricks and mortar store, a
website and a visit by a firm to a consumer's home. At the POS, firms
can have a significant advantage over other potential suppliers ('point
of sale advantage'). This is most likely to occur when consumers access
the POS poorly informed about the products, their substitutes and their
complements, and it is costly (in terms of' time, effort and/or
psychological pressure) to leave the POS without making a purchase to
gather more information or shop elsewhere.
Consumers may be uninformed at the POS for various
reasons."' Consumers may 'choose' to be uninformed for behavioral or
search cost reasons; it may be the first store they have visited as part of
their search strategy; they may receive an unanticipated visit from a
doorstep salesperson; or they may be faced with product offers they did
not expect such as upgrades or add-ons. Firms with a POS advantage
can introduce products to consumers they had not previously
considered, charge high prices or offer low quality terms and
conditions, and use a range of pressures to tempt consumers to make illconsidered decisions." 6
Interventions at the POS can be complements to remedies that
increase consumer information before the POS, or substitutes when
interventions before the POS are likely to be ineffective. Remedies at
the POS can attempt to limit a firm's POS advantage by enabling
consumers to defer purchasing decisions until they have the ability to
make informed choices; provide consumers with an enhanced ability at
making choices; or allow consumers to revise purchases after the POS.
The measures that are available to potentially help resolve the issues at
the POS include written quotations, which last for a fixed period of
time; in-store price comparisons; and cooling-off periods. Alternative
forms of market interventions to address the POS advantages can
include price control and preventing the sale of certain goods at
particular locations. The focus here is on interventions that seek to
" The likelihood that a consumer will be uninformed at the POS is greater when consumers
have only limited experience of the market, if any. See Section III for more details.
16 In the UK, the behavior of firms at POS is regulated through a fairly complex set of
consumer protection law and by a number of agencies, including trading standards, OFT and the
Advertising Standards Authority plus sectoral regulators covering food standards, financial
services and energy.
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change consumer behavior.
Before we review the impact of the remedies, we focus on the
issues that arise when consumers believe they have searched
adequately, but at the POS are faced with an unexpected choice of
upgrade or add-on.
A. The Economics of Add-Ons
Add-ons are products that complement a base good. There are
numerous examples which include popcorn at a cinema; .wine at a
restaurant; refreshments in a hotel room's mini bar; an extended
warranty for an electrical product; and an ink cartridge for a printer, to
mention just a few. For the purpose of this discussion, there is a
distinction between add-ons that complement a base good without
impairing the effectiveness of that base good,117 and add-ons that are
consumable and are necessary to make the base good work at all. 1 ' In
this Section, we are more concerned with the former, as in most
situations the latter are usually bought as replacements at a later date,
so firms do not benefit from a POS advantage.'
Add-ons sold at the POS can have high prices because it is
convenient for consumers to purchase a complementary product at the
same store rather than visiting another store to purchase a similar
product. The Chicago School argues that there may be no detriment to
consumers when firms charge excessive prices for add-ons, if
competition exists for the base good. Lal and Matutes 2 ° and
Verboven 21 show that in theory positive profits for add-ons will
intensify competition for the base good and the rents will be competed
away. For instance, if firms make an EX profit on each add-on sold, a
firm has a greater incentive to attract consumers with a lower base
good price to realize the add-on profit. Therefore, firms are willing to
undercut each other on base goods and, if the base goods are
homogeneous, this occurs to the extent that the price is LX below cost,
where firms receive normal profits. 2
More recently, Ellison extended the Chicago School's analysis
to show that positive profits on add-ons may not be competed away via
base good prices if firms also supply the base good to a number of more
For example, an extended warranty for a washing machine.
"s

For example, ink cartridges for printers and new blades for razors.

This is not to say that add-ons bought at a later date are unproblematic. Competition can
be affected as consumers may be locked-in to a certain consumable brand. Moreover, consumers
may find it difficult to estimate the life cost of the product when purchasing the base good. See
Section V for a discussion of these types of switching costs.
120Rajiv Lal & Carmen Matutes, Retail Pricing and Advertising Strategies, 67 J. OF Bus.,
"9

345 (994).

"' Frank Verboven, Product Line Rivalry and Market Segmentation-With an Application to
Automobile Optional Engine Pricing,47 J. OF INDUS. ECON. 399 0999).
12 The results of these models are driven by a similar intuition as the 'bargain-then-ripoff'
pricing when consumers face switching costs (discussed further in Section V).
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price-sensitive consumers who do not purchase the add-on. 123 Under
such circumstances, firms face an adverse selection problem that
reduces their incentive to set base good prices below marginal cost
compared with a situation where all consumers purchase the add-on or
where they are equally price sensitive. The intuition is that although a
lower base good price attracts rents from a greater number of
consumers who purchase the excessively priced add-on, it can result in
greater losses from the more price-sensitive consumers who do not do
so.
Firms' ability to set high prices for add-ons is aided by the fact
that consumers are usually poorly informed about add-ons at the POS.
For example, Cruickshank 1 4 finds that just under half of respondents
to a UK Treasury survey said they had "no idea" about the fees for their
bank's additional financial services and Hall"' reports that only 3 per
cent of printer owners claim to know the cost of printing when
purchasing a printer. Consumers' inability and unwillingness to find
information about add-ons before the POS is exacerbated in some
situations where firms seem to make gathering more information
difficult by obfuscating prices and not advertising add-on information.
For example, in the CC market inquiry into extended warranties on
domestic electrical goods, the CC argued that "Most manufacturers do
not actively promote their own [extended warranties]". 26
Gabaix and Laibson present a model of add-ons that focuses on
firms' incentives to advertise add-on prices or not.127 They consider a
market in which consumers have the possibility to substitute away
from add-ons before the POS. However, some consumers are
sophisticated, in the sense that they correctly forecast firms' add-on
prices if they are not advertised; but other consumers are myopic. in
that they do not consider purchase of the add-on until the POS of the
base good where they are captive as they have missed the opportunity
to purchase the add-on elsewhere. The model shows that when there is
a sufficient proportion of consumers that (myopically) select a firm on
the level of firms' base good prices only, firms find it profitable to not
advertise add-on prices. Firms exploit myopic consumers by attracting
them with low base good prices but set add-on prices at the monopoly
level. In contrast, sophisticated consumers take advantage of low base
good prices but substitute away from high priced add-ons. When there
is a sufficient proportion of sophisticates, however, firms advertise add.23
Glenn Ellison, A Model of Add-on Pricing, 120 Q. J. OF ECON. 585 (2005).
124 Don Cruickshank, "Review of Banking Services in the UK," (London: HM Treasury),
available at http://www.hm-treasurygov.uk/fin-bankreviewfinal.htm.
12' Robert Hall, The Inkjet Aftermarket: An Economic Analysis, (Stanford Univ., Working
Paper, 2007) available at http://www.stanford.edu/-rehall/Inkjet%2oAftermarket%2o I997.pdf.
26 Competition Commission, Extended warranties on domestic electrical goods, Cm 6o89 (Ii11) (2003), available at http://www.competition-commission.org.uklrep-pub/reports/2003/
485xwars.htm#summary.
127 Xavier
Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and
Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q.J.OF ECON. 505 (2o6).
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on prices and set prices of the base good and add-on at more cost
reflective levels.
Shapiro 2 ' argues that such obfuscation of add-on prices is likely
to be unsustainable as firms will have a unilateral incentive to advertise
add-on prices before the POS as this is likely to prompt consumers to
consider the impact of the add-on on their purchasing decision.
Therefore, if add-on prices are not advertised, each firm should have an
incentive to advertise a lower add-on price and increase its base good
price closer to marginal cost, so that consumers can realize that
purchasing both the base good and add-on at a firm with an observable
add-on price is a better option." 9
Gabaix and Laibson, however, show in their model that it is not
profitable for a firm to unilaterally advertise its add-on price when
other firms have obfuscated, even when it educates some myopic
consumers to act as if they are sophisticated. 3 ° The intuition is that
sophisticated and educated myopic consumers prefer to purchase from
firms that set high add-on prices compared to purchasing at the firm
that has advertised its base good, because they benefit from low-priced
base goods as they can avoid high-priced add-ons by purchasing
elsewhere.
With regards to interventions in add-on markets, the above
theoretical literature suggests that excessively high add-on prices is a
necessary but not sufficient condition to establish that a market is not
competitive, as rents can be passed through from add-ons to consumers
via low prices for base goods. Therefore, it is important for
policymakers to consider this possibility before intervening in an addon market, as any remedy that attempts to lower the prices of add-ons
when the profit margin is used to subsidize low base good prices can
have the side effect of increasing the prices for the base goods. Such an
intervention may be a benefit to consumers who purchase the add-on,
but detrimental to those who do not.
On the other hand, if a policymaker is of the opinion that an
add-on market is not sufficiently competitive but finds it difficult to
activate consumers to an extent that intensifies competition, an
alternative method to increase consumer welfare may be to activate
consumers in the base good market if rents are not passed through via
lower base good prices. For example, if, in the Ellison model 3 ', firms
have the ability to price discriminate between consumers who do and
do not purchase the add-on, firms would not face a problem of adverse
selection, which would enable them to pass through the rents from
high-priced add-ons. Consequently, providing firms with the ability to
12' Carl

Shapiro, Aftermarkets and Consumer Welfare: Making Sense of Kodak, 63

ANTITRUST L. J. 483 (1995).
29 This advertisement will turn consumers from being myopic to sophisticated; see Gabaix &

Laibson, supra note 127.
130Id.

' Ellison, supra note

123.
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price discriminate between add-on purchasers and non-purchasers may
resolve such competition issues.
Policymakers, however, may prefer base good and add-on
prices to be more cost reflective for non-competition reasons. There
may be sufficient consumer protection arguments that mean
policymakers prefer the pricing of add-ons and base goods to be more
cost reflective. For instance, firms selling high-priced add-ons may have
a greater incentive to actively encourage consumers to purchase their
add-ons at the POS, which may lead to pressure selling tactics.
Furthermore, there may also be distributional issues if a certain group
of consumers purchase the high-priced add-on, which subsidizes low
prices for the base goods.

B. Interventions
The following Sections discuss the potential effects of two
remedies: in-store price comparisons; and cooling-off periods.
i. In-Store Price Comparisons
In-store price comparisons are statements at the POS about the
firm's rivals' prices for similar products.' When consumers are at the
POS and have not searched the market thoroughly, in-store price
comparisons can increase competition within a market, as they can
provide rivals with the ability to credibly inform consumers of lower
prices for their products. This can lower prices as firms have greater
incentives to attempt to attract consumers from each other and
maintain the consumers that visit them first.'33 When consumers are
uncertain of - or underestimate - the benefits of searching other firms,
in-store price comparisons can also provide consumers with some of the
information needed to enable them to determine whether the marginal
benefit of visiting another store to purchase a similar product is greater
than the marginal cost. However, in-store price comparisons will only
be fully exploited by consumers if they provide credible comparisons
that are trustworthy.'3 4 This credibly can be achieved by the monitoring
of firms' comparisons by a trusted third party who removes and
2 Other possible comparisons at the POS include comparisons with a past price, for example
'now LX, was LY', or with a reference price, 'X% off recommended retail price'. The focus in this
Section is on present price comparisons with rivals' prices. See OFT (2005) "Research into
Misleading Price Comparisons," prepared for the OFT by the Nottingham Business School, June
2005 for discussion of the impact of other price comparisons on consumer behavior.
' Given that in-store price comparisons may increase the firms' ability to monitor each
other's strategies more closely, in some situations there is a possibility that this type of remedy may

increase the scope for tacit collusion in markets with certain structures and characteristics (see
Section VI).
134 For example, if comparisons are not credible, rational consumers will choose to disregard
the information, as all firms have incentives to claim they are the cheapest to prevent further
search, but if some consumers are not fully rational they may be misled by untruthful price claims.
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punishes erroneous comparisons.13
Nelson conjectured that false advertising can mislead even
fully-rational consumers if there is only partial monitoring of
comparisons, because consumers would trust the comparisons to some
extent but some may not be verified by the policymaker and turn out to
be incorrect.'3 6 This argument was formalized by Wilson for a duopoly
market selling homogeneous goods in the context of in-store price
comparisons.' 37 To understand the intuition, consider a situation where
consumers are initially uninformed of prices and they face costly search
to become informed. Without in-store price comparisons, prices will be
at the monopoly level and consumers will select one firm at random
38
and search no further.
However, when firms provide in-store price comparisons that
are only partially monitored, an increase in monitoring leads to two
effects. First, there is the "deception effect", which may lead to a larger
probability that consumers are misled by false comparisons as they
begin to trust comparisons more. This can provide firms with the
incentive to increase prices. Second, there is the "competition effect"
which leads to consumers being more able to purchase at the lowest
priced store. This provides firms with a greater incentive to reduce
price. In the context of his model, Wilson shows that the competition
effect is unambiguously larger than the deception effect.'3 9
The ease and costs of monitoring price comparisons are likely to
vary from industry to industry which will have an effect on the
appropriateness of such a remedy. When the POS is a bricks and
mortar shop or a website, monitoring price comparisons is likely to be
relatively simple in principle (although potentially costly), because the
comparisons and prices are public knowledge and can be verified
easily; whereas when the POS is on a consumer's doorstep, monitoring
and verifying comparisons can be much more difficult. The costs of
monitoring are also likely to be higher in markets where prices change
frequently. 4 ° In such cases, this is likely to place a large burden on
firms, not only due to administration costs, but also because it places
considerable risk on firms because of the increased likelihood of an outof-date comparison which can lead to harsh punishments from the
existing consumer protection legislation. Such compliance risks may be
135 In the UK, the Consumer Protection Act 1987 provides clear rules for in-store price
comparisons, which are enforced by local Trading Standards offices. Their powers of enforcement
aye considerable and providing misleading price comparisons is potentially a criminal offence.
Other consumer laws protect against misleading, false or inaccurate statements by sellers.
136Philip Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82 J. OF POL. ECON. 729 (1974).
1 Chris M. Wilson, The Effects of Consumer Protection on Sales Signs, Consumer Search
and Competition (CCP Working Paper 05-9, 2005).
1 This result is the Diamond paradox. See Section M.A for more details.
Wilson,
Ws9
supra note 137.
140 While covered by the Consumer Protection Act I987 in the UK, a remedy may want to
specify the frequency with which firms monitor rivals' prices. However, such remedies may
impact on the frequency of price revisions.
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a particular problem for smaller firms, who have fewer resources to
comply with all relevant legislation and to monitor prices accurately.
Exempting smaller firms from the comparison requirements may
alleviate this problem to some extent, but this may place them at a
competitive disadvantage, as comparisons direct consumers to those
firms that are compared.
When the issues regarding monitoring are manageable, in-store
price comparisons are likely to be more effective in activating
consumers in homogeneous product markets. When products that are
compared have non-price differences, consumers will be less price
sensitive compared to a situation when consumers perceive the
products to be homogeneous, so they may not search even if they are
informed that a rival's product is cheaper.'4 1 Moreover, non-price
differences may increase the complications which arise from market
definition as there will be a product as well as a geographic dimension
to determine which firms should be compared.
A subtler problem regarding which products should be included
and which excluded from the price comparisons than how the market is
defined, is how much information consumers require."' An excessive
number of comparisons can lead to information overload, which may
mean consumers choose to ignore such comparisons so limiting the
remedy's effectiveness. Too few comparisons may mean consumers will
not be directed to the lowest-priced firm, which may lead to consumers
questioning and, in the extreme, disregarding the information
provided.'43 When consumers in general prefer limited information, a
compromise could require that firms compare their price with the
lowest-priced rival, which would direct consumers who are only
interested in price to the best deal in the market. This would also
provide firms with a greater incentive to set the lowest price as it would
receive free advertising in each of its rival's stores. However, a caveat
to this is required when firms are vertically differentiated, as this
remedy may provide an incentive for firms to lower their product's
quality to reduce costs in the pursuit of becoming the cheapest firm.
ii. Cooling-Off Periods
A cooling-off period provides consumers with the ability to
cancel a contract unconditionally or return a product to receive a full
.41Price information of differentiated products may still assist consumers to take account of
the actual price effects on their purchasing decisions rather than forming expectations of the likely

price dispersion across the market. The consumers could then use this information to understand
whether their non-price preferences are strong enough to warrant purchasing the product at the
POS.
O2 In general, policymakers have much experience regarding definition of markets and so are
likely to determine which firms are involved with a high degree of accuracy, but less is known
about the information requires of consumers.
14 This may be complicated further if firms bundle their products differently and such
comparisons may lead to excessive bundling as firms attempt to differentiate their offerings.
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refund from the firm during a given period. This remedy is generally
imposed in order to give consumers the opportunity to reconsider
purchases of goods they have not previously seen, contracts they have
not had the opportunity to read, or products purchased under pressure.
This can prevent consumers from being exploited at the POS as firms
are unable to impose unfavorable refund terms and conditions to
prevent the product being returned."' Cooling-off periods may also
help competition in markets where some consumers are inactive before
the POS, because consumers may prefer to try a product out with the
intention of returning the good if it is not of the required quality rather
than undertaking research about the available products beforehand.145
For the remedy to be successful, consumers must be aware of the period
that the return is available for, be prepared to revise their purchasing
decision post-purchase and be willing to return the product.146
There is only limited research into the effects of cooling-off
periods. However, we can draw some inferences on their likely
effectiveness from research of similar practices such as money back
guarantees (MBGs) that are sometimes used as a marketing strategy by
firms. These are similar in that they both allow consumers to revise a
decision post-purchase, but differ in that MBGs are profitable
strategies for firms and are usually conditional on a consumer's
dissatisfaction with the quality of a firm's product. Nevertheless, both
cooling-off periods and MBGs can have the same effect on consumers
as it reduces the risk of purchasing a product that does not match their
preferences.
The literature on MBGs has shown that this reduction in risk
can lead to a problem of moral hazard as it may make consumers more
risk loving when purchasing a product, because they have the ability to
return the product if they are not satisfied.147 Consequently, the
introduction of a cooling-off period may increase the number of
uninformed purchases at the POS and increase the number of returns.
Although this may not cause adverse welfare effects in isolation, a
cooling-off period may be detrimental if it increases consumers'
uninformed purchases and at the POS they underestimate the hassle

...
In George Loewenstein, Ted O'Donoghue, & Matthew Rabin, Projection Bias in
PredictingFuture Utility, (UC Berkeley Economics, Working Paper Eoo-28 4 , 2000) it is argued
that firms' pressure selling techniques at the POS can put a consumer into a "hot state", which
increases the likelihood that they will make a purchase at the POS that they would not have made
when they are in a "cool state". The ability to return the product provides consumers with the
chance to revise their decision when they have 'cooled off'.
14' This could also have the potential of reducing ex ante search if consumers perceive ex post
switching as a substitute.
146 A distinction needs to be made in this paper as to cancellation rights, which are available
at any point during the contract, rather than just after a short period of time. The effects of
cancellation rights are discussed in Section V.
147 See Duncan P. Mann & Jennifer P. Wissink, Money-Back Contracts
with Double Moral
Hazard, 19 RAND J. OF EcON. 282 (1988); and Duncan P. Mann & Jennifer P. Wissink, MoneyBack Warranties vs. Replacement Warranties, 8o AM. ECON. REV. 432 (1990).
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costs of returning the product in the future.'4 8 As a result, consumers
may not return the product if they are dissatisfied, even though they
planned to do so in the event of being dissatisfied when they purchased
the product. This could mean they end up accepting more bad
purchases that they would have done without a cooling-off period.149
To minimize such a side effect from a mandated cooling-off
period, it is important that policymakers attempt to keep the hassle cost
of returns low relative to the price of the product and ensure that firms
do not try to artificially increase the costs on consumers. This can be
achieved by complementing the cooling-off period with other
information regarding the consumers' rights. Nevertheless, it is equally
important to realize that cooling-off periods also impose significant
costs on firms which not only include the cost of administrating returns
but also the lost value of the returned good (if any). When consumers
have low hassle costs they may exploit the returns policy by what is
known as 'free renting' (when consumers purchase the product with
the intention of returning it after limited use). The importance of these
costs is illustrated by Davis et al, who show that firms impose hassle
costs on MBGs to prevent such behavior. 5 °
Cooling-off periods will not be effective if consumers are unable
or unwilling to reassess their purchasing decisions within the required
period, as they will not realize when they have made a poor purchasing
decision. Whether consumers revise their decision or not is likely to
vary from product to product. For example, consumers are less able to
revise purchasing decisions for credence goods compared to experience
goods, as they are unable to update their beliefs about the product postpurchase for credence goods. However, even for experience goods,
consumers must become better informed about the product quickly to
be able to exploit the ability to return in the required time frame.
Therefore, the length of. the cooling-off period becomes important.
Mandated cooling-off periods tend to be of i, 2 or 4 weeks. 5
When considering the optimal length of a cooling-off period,
there may be a trade-off that policymakers need to consider. For
example, a lengthy cooling-off period may allow consumers to analyze
whether the product is of a desirable standard but a shorter period may
mean that consumers will not delay redeeming their refund and so do
not eventually forget to do so. Although there is no empirical evidence
that this occurs for cooling-off periods, Silk 5 2 finds evidence that
"' Consumers incur hassle costs when employing a cooling-off period, because they must
spend time and effort returning the product to the firm.
"' See Joseph P. Mulholland, BehaviouralEconomics and the FederalTrade Commission,
Presentation to the Australian Productivity Commission Roundtable on Behavioural Economics
and Public Policy (Aug. 2007).
15o Scott Davis, Eitan Gerstner, & Michael Hagerty, Money Back Guarantees: Matching
Products to Consumer Tastes, 71 J. OF RETAILING 22 (1998).
...The cooling-off periods implemented in the CC's market investigation of extended
warranties on domestic electrical goods last 45 days.
152 Tim Silk, Getting Started Is Half the Battle: The Influence of Deadlines and Effort on
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consumers forget to redeem rebates on prices - especially when
redemption periods are long.'53 The optimal length of a cooling-off
period is likely to vary between different goods, and without further
research this is likely to remain unknown. If consumers are more likely
to forget to use cooling-off periods it may be worthwhile requiring firms
to remind consumers that the cooling-off period is approaching its end.
This is likely to increase marginal cost for some firms if
communications are conducted by telephone or by post, but for internet
retailers, where communications are usually conducted by email, an
automatic reminder would add very little cost for firms.
C. Summary
The remedies discussed in this Section are aimed at resolving
the problems that occur when consumers are inadequately prepared at
the POS. The remedies are aimed at either giving consumers more time
to search for information themselves or directly providing consumer
with information. The former are only effective when consumers are
willing and able to search the market. The incentive to search may be
affected by whether the consumer already possesses the good (coolingoff periods) or can purchase it at known terms of trade at a later date
(written quotations). They are more likely to be effective where
unexpected add-ons are introduced at the POS, because in this case
there may be good reason for the lack of pre-POS search' 54 . The latter
can be effective where goods are relatively homogeneous and there are
few firms. However, these conditions mirror those identified in Section
VI as most likely to cause concern about tacit collusion.
A common feature of the remedies discussed in this Section is
the lack of direct empirical evidence of likely impacts. The existing
evidence is more indirect arising from research on MBGs and rebates.
In addition, apart from add-ons, the theoretical analysis is also sparse.
V. INTERVENTIONS TO HELP CONSUMERS SWITCH SUPPLIERS

This Section discusses the interventions that are available to
intensify competition between firms by increasing the likelihood of the

ConsumerSelf-Regulation to Redeem Rewards (Univ. of British Columbia, Working Paper, 2oo6).
' A rebate is similar to a cooling-off period in that consumers need to expend some effort to
receive a refund on some proportion of the price, but differs in that consumers still own the good
or receive the service after they redeem the rebate. In Silk's experiment, subjects are able to buy
two cinema tickets for $ii or for $i3 with a $6 or $9 rebate, which could be redeemed by mail
within 1,7 or 21 days depending upon the treatment. Since the majority of subjects selected the
more expensive price with the rebate, it shows that consumers expected to redeem the rebate,
otherwise they would purchase at the lower price. However, 25-35 per cent of consumers that
purchased the product with a rebate did not redeem it and the likelihood that the rebate was not
redeemed increased with the length of the redemption period.
1s4 Recall that that high-priced add-ons may not cause detriment if there is competition for
the base good.
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consumer switching firms. Many products and services involve further
(repeat) purchasing and service contracts may be of indefinite duration
or subject to automatic renewals. For some products, consumers
switching to a new supplier face a cost when, which is not incurred if
they remain loyal to their current supplier. Such switching costs
provide firms with a degree of market power as consumers have an
incentive to continue purchasing the product from their supplier even if
a rival, who sells an identical product, is known to be slightly cheaper.
When consumers are reluctant to switch supplier, firms can charge high
prices, exploit high entry barriers and attempt to strengthen their
position by increasing switching costs further.
To switch between firms, customers would require the
necessary information about rival offers and hence any reluctance to
search would also hamper switching.'55 Remedies can increase
customers' willingness to switch by preventing consumer lock-in,
lowering the tangible and intangible costs that consumers incur when
switching. suppliers, and encouraging firms to offer cost reflective
prices. The measures that are available to potentially help resolve the
issues after the POS include: cancellation rights or limitations on
contract duration; product attribute portability; and customer
information portability.
Before analyzing the likely impact the remedies may have on
markets, we provide a brief review of the economics literature on
switching costs." 6 The next sub-Section analyses more closely the
differences between certain types of switching costs and the
implications of lowering switching costs in a competitive market.
A. The Economics of Switching
The 2003 OFT study defined switching costs as "the real or
perceived costs that are incurred when changing supplier but which are
not incurred by remaining with the current supplier"." 7 The extent and
nature of switching costs can vary for different products. In some cases
they can be observed and quantified by third parties, while in others
only consumers themselves may perceive switching costs. As outlined
by Klemperer 55 and the OFT" 9 , switching costs can fall into six
'5' Issues arising from lack of price and non-price information, and associated remedies, are
discussed in Section III. Some people treat search and switching costs as a single cost. Research by
Chris Wilson, Markets with Search and Switching Costs, (CCP Working Paper o6-1o, 2oo6) and
Yoonhee Tina Chang & Catherine Waddams Price, Gain or Pain:Does Consumer Activity Reflect
Utility Maximisation? (CCP Working Paper, forthcoming 2008) show that there are important
differences between these costs and that incorrect inferences may be made by grouping these costs
together.
156 Section II.B provides a general overview in of how switching costs can affect markets. For
more discussion of the effects of switching costs in a potentially collusive market see Section VI.
'57 Switching Costs, supra note 18.
's Paul Klemperer, Competition When Consumers Have Switching Costs: An Overview with
Applications to Industrial Organisation, Macroeconomics and InternationalTrade, 62 REV. OF
ECON. STUD. 515 (1995).

Loyola Consumer Law Review

478

[Vol. 2 1:4

categories, defined in the table below:
1 60
TABLE I: CATEGORIES OF SWITCHING COSTS

Transaction
costs

For some goods and services there can be significant transaction
costs of switching supplier. These costs can include the opportunity
cost of time taken or the monetary costs that a consumer has to
incur to switch supplier.

Contractual
costs

Firms can construct loyalty programs that provide consumers with
benefits each time they purchase from their brand. This can provide
consumers with incentives to repeat purchase at a firm as they
usually receive lower rewards if they switch between different
firms.

Informational
costs

For some differentiated products, consumers may incur a cost of
learning how to use a new product, which they would not incur if
they continued purchasing the product from their previous supplier.

Compatibility
costs

Compatibility costs can occur when consumers purchase a durable
base good and a complementary add-on, as the add-on of 'a specific
brand may not be compatible with another brand's base good.
Consumers then have to purchase the durable base good of another
brand to be able to use that brand's add-on.

Uncertainty
costs

Consumers may be reluctant to switch supplier if they are less
certain of a product's quality compared with a brand they use
frequently.

Psychological
costs

Even when there is no objective reason for consumers to exhibit
brand loyalty, experience of purchasing a product in the past or an
effective advertising campaign may affect a consumer's preferences.

The effects upon competition of the different types of switching
costs can vary. Nilssen suggested that transactional costs have more of
an impact on a market than informational costs since consumers incur
costs each time they cancel a contract, but learning only needs to be
undertaken once. 61 For example, if a consumer switches from brand A
to brand B, returning to brand A would not require them to learn how
to use the product, but they would experience the hassle of terminating
the contract and beginning another. 6 2 Furthermore firms may have the
potential to select endogenously the level of contractual costs and
transactional costs in order to dampen competition.' 63 In general a firm
's
'6

Switching Costs, supra note 18.'
Searching costs, sometimes included as a type of switching cost, are not included here.

61 Tore Nilssen, Two Kinds of Consumer Switching Costs, 23 RAND J. OF ECON. 579

(992).

This result relies on consumers not forgetting how to use the product.
163 In a theoretical model, D. Koh, Competition by Endogenous Switching Time, (UCLA
Graduate School of Management, Working Paper, 1993) shows that firms may prefer to commit to
162
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will attempt to increase costs of switching away from its product while
trying to reduce the cost of switching to it, so as to be able to attract its
rivals' consumers but keep its own customers locked-in. For example
Adams describes how the manufacturers of razors and profitable razor
blades attempted to make their razor blades compatible with other
manufacturers' razors, but their razors only compatible with their own
64
razor blades.
Transaction costs and contractual costs are also more likely to
provide firms with the capability to price discriminate between
consumers they have supplied before and those they haven't, as their
'old' consumers are likely to have contracts with firms that make them
distinguishable from potential new consumers.165 The ability to price
discriminate between consumers affects the *firms' incentives to
compete for new and existing consumers. When firms are able to price
discriminate between their customers and their rivals' customers, lower
switching costs can intensify competition. For example, Chen analyses
a two-period duopoly model where firms can offer discounts to a rival's
customers.'6 6 Customers have heterogeneous switching costs which are
unknown by the firms, so customers with low switching costs may
switch firms. The model shows that offering discounts to a rival's
customers means that firms face more elastic demand, as consumers are
more likely to switch. This intensifies competition compared to a
situation where firms are not able to price discriminate. Despite more
intensive competition, consumers may not necessarily be better off:
switching is costly and, compared with a situation where price
discrimination is not possible, some consumers may be charged higher
prices.
On the other hand, when firms do not have the ability to price
discriminate between consumers who are "locked-in" into the their
product and those who are not, they face a trade-off between setting
high prices to extract rents from captive consumers and low prices to
increase their market share. As a result, the effect on prices of lowering
switching costs is ambiguous. The intuition is that lower switching
costs lead to an incentive for a firm to set either a lower price, to
prevent captive consumers switching to rivals; or to set a higher price,
because new customers are less valuable in the future as they are freer
to move to other suppliers:
Despite this ambiguous theoretical result about the effect of
switching costs, Klemperer provides three arguments that increased
switching costs will generate higher prices.'67 First, firms discount the
positive switching costs to dampen price competition before they compete in prices.
164

RUSSELL B. ADAMS, KING C GILLETTE: THE MAN AND HIS WONDERFUL SHAVING

DEVICE (Little Brown, 1978).
165 See Klemperer, supra note 158, at 526-27.
" Yongmin Chen, Paying Consumers to Switch, 6 J. OF ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 877
('997).
167 Klemperer, supra note 158.
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future, so they prefer to receive a given amount of profit in the present
(the profits from exploiting captive consumers) compared with the
future (profits from newly recruited consumers). Second, with positive
switching costs, setting a higher price today increases the market share
of a rival today which makes that rival less aggressive in competing for
new consumers tomorrow, enabling the firm to attract consumers
tomorrow with a higher price. Third, consumers realize that with
positive switching costs, a low price today will be followed with a high
price tomorrow as the low price is only profitable if it creates a large set
of captured consumers today which can be "exploited" tomorrow.
Consumers hence become less responsive to price, i.e. their demand
becomes less elastic. Given that new consumers are less responsive to
price decreases, there is a smaller incentive to set lower prices to attract

them. 161
B. Interventions
The following Sections discuss the potential effect of three
remedies: cancellation rights; product attribute portability; and
customer information portability.
i. Cancellation Rights

169

Cancellation rights allow consumers to terminate a continuous
service contract (usually after-giving notice for a certain period). This
cancellation can be at no cost to the consumer or at a pro rata amount
for any period of the original contract which has not been honored. 7 '
This remedy enables consumers to escape from a contract they have
realized is not appropriate for them or when they realize that another
contract is better. This can provide consumers with confidence in
switching suppliers where they otherwise may be unwilling to switch if
they are concerned about being locked-in to a contract which may later
prove sub-optimal. Cancellation rights can also facilitate entry into the
168 This result relies on consumers' ability to forecast the future correctly. Consumers twho
expect price cuts to be maintained in the future are more responsive to current price, as their
expected benefits from switching are greater. See Monica Giulietti, Catherine Waddams Price, &
Michael Waterson, Consumer Choice and Competition Policy: A Study of UK Energy Markets, iI5
ECON. J. 49 (2oo5). As a result, firms may have an incentive to initially set low prices. Consumers
may find their beliefs to be incorrect, however, as firms have an incentive to increase price once
consumers become locked-in. See Christian Von Weizsdcker, The Cost of Substitution, 52
ECONOMETRICA io85 (1984).
169The effects of cancellation rights in this situation are very similar to those of cooling-off
periods. To avoid duplication of these arguments this Section focuses on the impact of cancellation
rights when the contract is for ongoing supply and cancellation can happen after longer periods,
say, 12 months, as opposed to shorter periods, say, 3o days.
170 An example of cancellation rights is Ofgem's 28-day rule, which allowed consumers to get
out of a contract after giving 28 days' notice, although the firms could charge "a reasonable
cancellation fee". See OFGEM, "Consumer Protection in Energy Supply: The Role of the 28 Day
Rule," Ofgem submission to the Energy Services Working Group (July 2003).
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market as an entrant may be able to attract consumers who would have
been locked-in to the incumbent firm. For the remedy to be successful
consumers must understand the conditions under which they can cancel
current and future contracts, be well-informed about competing offers,
and be willing and able to cancel and switch.
A drawback to cancellation rights arises if it prevents
consumers from benefiting
from commitment to a longer-term
relationship with their current supplier. Contracts that offer bargains
up front may not be available if firms are uncertain of supplying
consumers for a long period. Theoretical models demonstrate that longterm contracts allow some consumers to be locked-in for the duration of
their contract, which can lead to 'bargains' initially but 'rip-offs' in the
future. When it is less likely that consumers can be locked-in so there is
a rip-off phase of the pricing, firms are more reluctant to offer bargains
at the beginning of the contract. Consumers may then be deprived of
low priced innovative products as incentives to sign up to the long-term
contract.
This reasoning lay behind the UK energy regulator Ofgem's
decision to remove a '28-day rule' which had enabled customers to
cancel their contracts with that period's notice."i Ofgem wanted to
create incentives for suppliers to invest in long-term energy saving
measures, equivalent to a offer in the 'bargain' phase of the contract.
Since firms are more certain that the cost of such an investment will be
recouped within a contract which is not subject to 28 days' notice, they
are more likely to invest in consumption
reducing measures which
172
further environmental objectives.
More fundamentally, providing consumers with the ability to
cancel a contract with a short period's notice may cause uncertainty
about whether firms can cover their fixed costs. This may make them
reluctant to remain in or even enter a market. Furthermore, the security
of a loyal customer base on long-term contracts can directly lower the
firms' cost of capital, which may be passed through as lower prices to
customers. Consequently introducing cancellation rights may increase
prices either through decreased competition, as firms exit or do not
enter the market, or by increasing the cost of capital.
ii. Product Attribute Portability

Product attribute portability allows consumers to transfer an
attribute of their current firm's product or service to another firm when
they switch. This remedy has the potential to reduce switching costs
when consumers are attached to a certain attribute of the firm's
product or service and this attribute is not transferable to other firms
171Id.
17' This is similar to the contracts for mobile phones, as consumers that sign up for longer

contracts are provided with more expensive and innovative mobile phones.
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when consumers switch. The most prominent example of this remedy is
the portability of phone numbers in telephony markets.'
Given the
perceived success of number portability, policymakers may wish to
implement a similar remedy for other product attributes. 7 4 For the
remedy to be effective in other general situations the attribute that
consumers are attached to must be identifiable; it must be the main
impediment to switching; and
property rights must be easily
transferable between firms or between the firm and consumer.
Evidence indicates that competition within telephony markets
has increased since the introduction of number portability. Lyons,
studying a dataset on mobile number portability (MNP) from 38
countries from 1999 to 2004, found that consumer switching increased
when mobile numbers are portable and the switching process takes less
than five days, but not if it takes longer.'
Thereis also evidence that,
in markets where increased switching has been observed, average
prices are reduced by 6.6 per cent in the short-term (three months) but
the effect in the long-term is much greater at 12 per cent. Moreover
Viard analyses toll-free 8oo-numbers in the US, which provide callers
with the ability to contact firms without paying for the call
themselves. 7 6 In 1986 the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
decided toll-free calls should be routed based upon the next 3 digits
after 8oo (8oo-NXX-YYYY) with each provider of toll-free services,
assigned a unique NXX code. In I993 the FCC allowed inter-exchange
carriers (IXCs) to switch providers without changing numbers. Prices
fell, on average, by 4.4 per cent in the period after phone numbers
became portable. 7 17
. Number portability arguably lowers switching costs in the telephony markets because
informing friends and family of a new number may be very costly. As a result, switching providers
without changing numbers reduces this cost and is likely to make consumers more willing to
switch.
'74 For instance, a similar example to number portability is the portability of direct debits
when switching current accounts. Introducing a reliable system for portability of direct debits may
lower consumers' switching costs by reducing concerns about incorrect transfer of existing direct
debits.
175 Sean Lyons, Measuring the Benefits of Mobile Number Portability, (working paper,
Trinity College, Dublin) (May 2oo6).
176 V. Brian Viard, Do Switching Costs Make Markets More or Less Competitive?: The Case
of 8oo-number Portability,RAND J. OF ECON. (forthcoming).
...The major difference between Sean Lyons, Measuring the Benefits of Mobile Number
Portability, (Trinity College, Dublin, Working Paper, 2oo6) and Viard, supra note 173 is that
mobile companies have the ability to price discriminate between new and existing users, whereas
IXCs do not. In both cases number portability has enhanced competition and prices have fallen.
The evidence from Viard (2oo8) is a business-to-business (B2B) market. One may not expect a
considerable difference between the behavior of a B2B market compared to a business-toconsumer (B2C) market, except that the switching cost is likely to be greater for small businesses
compared with consumers. Businesses are more likely to advertise their phone numbers, so
changing numbers can increase advertising costs, and may lead to firms losing consumers.
...Despite empirical evidence that number portability has intensified competition in
telephone markets, to estimate the overall benefit to consumers it is necessary to consider the
prices of related goods. For example, Stefan Buehler & Justus Haucap, Mobile Number
Portability, 4 J. OF INDUS. COMPETITION & TRADE 223 (2004) conjecture that although the price
of phone calls has fallen as a result of introducing number portability, it is likely that the price of
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Attribute portability is likely to be significantly easier to
implement when the attribute can be transferred to the consumer
without imposing significant costs upon the firms, as in the number
portability case." 9 However, in general, it is likely that the firms may
own and value the attribute to which consumers are attached, and so
they must be compensated for transfer of the attribute. This may cause
problems if it is difficult to transfer the ownership of the attribute from
the firm to the consumer, so it becomes necessary to transfer the
attribute directly between firms. The CC came across this problem,
among other things, in their recent market investigation into the supply
of bulk liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) for domestic use in the UK."'
They found that when a switch occurred between suppliers of domestic
LPG, it was common practice for the outgoing supplier to remove its
tank, so that it could be replaced with a similar tank by the incoming
supplier. Due to the costly nature of removing and installing tanks,
consumers faced charges from both the incoming and outgoing
suppliers. Consequently the number of consumers willing to switch
suppliers was low and competition limited. To remedy the problem of
high switching costs, the CC considered whether they could transfer
ownership of LPG tanks to consumers but, because of the hazardous
nature of LPG the CC decided on safety grounds that transferring
ownership of tanks between suppliers was a safer way to lower
switching costs. The remedy enabled the incoming supplier to purchase
the tank from the outgoing supplier, who is obliged to accept a
'backstop price'.
When attributes are not transferable they may bestow other
benefits on consumers which would be lost if the attribute becomes
transferable. For example, if mobile numbers are not transferable
between firms, consumers can recognize which company supplies any
phone user. since each company's numbers begins with the same
numbers. This can provide information to consumers about the cost of
a phone call if they can identify the company which supplies the person
they are calling.
Furthermore, if the attribute portability lowers transparency of
pricing for consumers, firms may have an incentive to raise prices.
handsets has increased, because firms have a smaller incentive to compete ex ante for customers as
their ex post profit is limited. Therefore, consumers may not have benefited from number
portability as much as the evidence from the price of phone calls alone suggests.
171Making an attribute transferable between firms is likely to result in some increase in the
costs imposed on firms. If this occurs some proportion of such cost may be passed on to consumers,
so the benefits of reducing switching costs could be offset by higher prices. This is likely to be a
short-term increase in marginal cost as firms will learn how to implement switching more cheaply
as they become more experienced. Any increase in cost would need to be set against benefits. With
regard to mobile number portability, see Jerry Ellig, Costs and Consequences of Federal
Telecommunications and BroadbandRegulations, 58 FED. COMM. L. J. 37 (2006); and R. Aoki & J.
Small, The Economics of Number Portability: Switching Costs and Two- Part Tariffs, (Univ. of
Auckland, Working Paper, 1999).
"sSee Final Report by CC on "Domestic bulk liquefied petroleum gas" available at
http://www.competition-commission.org.uklrep-pub/reports/2oo6/5 I4Ipg.htm.
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.Buehler and Haucap show that if number portability eliminates
switching costs, the effect is unambiguously beneficial for consumers;
but if it means telephone numbers no longer identify companies,
termination charges increase, with an ambiguous net effect on
customers. 1 ' Similarly, Gans and King examine the influence of mobile
network competition on the prices of fixed-to-mobile calls." 2 When
fixed line consumers can distinguish between the different mobile
networks they are calling, fixed-to-mobile call prices will fall.
Therefore, it may be necessary to attempt to resolve any benefit lost due
to non-portability. Policymakers have tried to compensate for the
negative effects of number portability. In Finland and Germany
consumers can call a toll-free number to find out which company serves
a particular number; and in Portugal, Ireland and Belgium an audio
sound signals that the consumer is making an off-net call.'83 However
such remedies can be costly themselves and "are often considered a
nuisance by many consumers.' '84
iii. Customer Information Portability
Competition may not be fully effective when firms do not have
the same information about rivals' customers. When a consumer and a
firm interact repeatedly, the firm may obtain better information about
the consumer's attributes than rival firms. Where the cost of supplying
consumers varies, the current supplier can offer low-cost consumers a
better deal. Rivals without this information would have to offer a single
price to new consumers based on some measure of average costs to
supply. Such offers would only be attractive to high cost of supply
consumers. Getting such an adverse selection of consumers makes it
unprofitable for a rival to attract new consumers.'
Such asymmetric
information may prevent rivals from offering alternatives which they
would otherwise have proposed.
Ausube 86 and Calem and Mester'87 provide evidence that
See Buehler & Haucap, supra note 178.
Joshua S. Gans & Stephen P. King, Mobile Network Competition, Customer Ignorance
and Fixed-to- Mobile Call Prices, 12 INFO. ECON. & POL'Y 301 (2ooo).
113 Stephan Buehler, Ralf Dewenter, & Justus Haucap, Mobile Number Portability
in
SI

'8'

Europe, 3o TELECOMMUNICATIONS POL'Y 385 (2oo6).

1' See id. An alternative to solving the loss of transparency is to impose the 'receiving party
pays' (RPP) regime for termination charges as opposed to the 'calling party pays' (CPP) regime,
which eliminates the need for consumers to be informed of the network they are calling. See Ralf
Dewenter & Jorn Kruse, Calling Party Pays or Receiving Party Pays? The Diffusion of Mobile
Telephony with Endogenous Regulation, (Helmut-Schmidt-Univ. Hamburg, Working Paper,
2005); and S.C. Littlechild, Mobile Termination Charges: Calling Party Pays versus Receiving
Party Pays, (Univ. of Cambridge, Working Paper 0426, 2004) for further discussion of the impact
of the RPP and CPP regimes.
"' The problems described above are usually observed in the credit market, where firms may
be unsure of the credit worthiness of consumers, and in insurance markets, where firms may be
unsure of the risks involved of insuring certain individuals.
186 Lawrence M. Ausubel, The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market, 8, AM.
ECON. REV. 5o (1991).
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credit card rates are unresponsive to market fluctuations because banks
may not wish to unilaterally lower rates. Consumers with low defaults
search less than others, since they 'do not intend to borrow for long'
and searching for lower prices is less beneficial; more credit worthy
consumers are less likely to change lender as they receive more
favorable terms from their current lenders; and consumers with large
debts may have greater difficulty in switching because those who are
trying to switch are indistinguishable from those who wish to acquire
more debt.188 The problem here is not that consumers do not look for a
better offer, but rather that no such offer is forthcoming. Asymmetric
information between firms dampens competition in the market.' 9
This adverse selection problem can be solved if the information
that is available to a supplying firm is also made available to rivals.
Such information will enable rival firms to offer consumers a price
related to the cost of supplying them. This will increase competition for
profitable consumers and provide them with better terms of trade.
Customer information portability increases firms' willingness to
compete for customers. Such a remedy is likely to be more successful
when information is directly related to 'cost of supply' differences,
firms can use cost reflective pricing, and firms use information in the
same manner. If customer information provision is to be effective it is
essential that it provides firms with the ability to distinguish between
profitable and non-profitable consumers. For instance, if credit history
is a good indicator for future credit worthiness, then firms may benefit
from information about consumers' past behavior in the credit market.
In addition, it is necessary that firms are able to set individualized
prices, so they can respond to the information provided.
Klapper 90 and Mester"9' provide evidence that a portable
reliable credit history lowers costs for firms in the credit market. Avery
et al suggest the information on consumers' credit histories that creditreporting agencies maintain in the US has lowered the risk of supplying
consumers with credit, which lowers the cost.'92 Miller suggests
accurate and portable credit rating could increase lending and reduce
'8'

Paul S. Calem & Loretta J. Mester, Consumer Behaviour and the Stickiness of Credit-

Card Interest Rates, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1327 (1995).
188Ausubel, supra note 186; Calem & Mester, supra note 187.
' The adverse selection problem discussed in this Section has similarities with the adverse
selection problem discussed in Section I, where consumers cannot determine the quality of the
product they are buying pre-purchase. Conversely this Section focuses on firms which lack
information about consumer 'quality'. The issues in this Section also contain parallels with the
switching cost literature discussed above, with the difference that in the current context firms pay
the cost of consumers switching. See Klemperer, supra note 18.
"9 Leora Klapper, "Development of Credit Reporting around the World," The World Bank,
Development Research Group (2004), available at http://wwwi.worldbank.org/finance/htmlU
accessfinance/i 12 004/credit.htm.
' Loretta J. Mester, What's the Point of Credit Scoring? FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF
PHILADELPHIA BUS. REV. 3 (Sept.-Oct. 1997).
"92Robert B. Avery, Paul S. Calem, & Glenn B. Canner, Credit Report Accuracy and Access
to Credit, Federal Reserve Bulletin, 297 (Summer 2004), available at http://www.federalreserve.
gov/pubs/bulletin/2004/summero4_credit.pdf.
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price for credit worthy consumers.'9 3 Barron and Staten show that both
positive and negative information can help creditors to make a good
decision. 19 4 They provide evidence that this makes the market more
competitive and so reduces prices. Cohen studies the effects on the
Israeli insurance industry where there is no portability and found that:
(i) insurers make more profit on repeat customers and that this is driven
by profits made on customers with good records with. the insurer; (ii)
this profit is higher the longer the relationship between insurer and
customer; and (iii) the price to the low risk customers is not fully
reflected in the premium offered. The low risk customers who do not
switch pay lower premiums, but not as low as they might have done
with more intense competition." 5
An accurate and portable credit history also increases the
options available to consumers by reducing the risk to firms of
attracting new consumers. Consequently lenders are less dependent on
their existing consumers as they can develop trust with new borrowers
more quickly. Since consumers with good credit histories will receive
lower prices, they will be more likely to be able to repay the loan, which
will in turn provide them with a better credit rating in the future.'96
Sharing information about consumer characteristics is most
valuable to firms, and hence more likely to increase competition for
consumers, if firms rely on -and use this information in a similar way.
Where they use different measures or different ways of calculating such
measures, customer information portability will have less impact. For
example, different firms have different ways of calculating the risks
involved with supplying consumers with credit and insurance. As a
result, firms may not collect data that is not relevant to them, but
would be relevant to a rival supplier. To maximize the potential benefit
from number portability, the information collected may need to be
standardized, to enable all firms to calculate their risks. This may
increase the costs of firms somewhat, which can lead to an increase in
price. 197

Ownership of customer information, may be controversial.
Consumers may not wish their information to be available to firms,
especially after recent episodes of release of sensitive data in the UK.
Access to such information could be subject to permission from
consumers, who might need to have the benefits explained.
Information provided by a rival is beneficial only if it is trusted.

'9' MARGARET

J.

MILLER, CREDIT

REPORTING

SYSTEMS

AND

THE

INTERNATIONAL

ECONOMY (MIT Press, 2003).
194 John M. Barron & Michael Staten, The Value of Comprehensive Credit Reports: Lessons
from the US Experience, Credit Research Center, Georgetown Univ. (2000).
' Alma Cohen, Asymmetric Learning in Repeated Contracting: An Empirical Study,
(NBER, Working Paper No W13752, 2oo8).
196See also Competition Commission's report on Home Credit (2oo6) available at
http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/rep-pub/reports/2oo65. 7homecredit.htm.
19'
It may also raise concerns about tacit collusion. See Section VI.
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Suppliers have an incentive to offload high cost customers to
competitors and so to misrepresent the information.." 8 Some audit
process is required to confirm the data, without facilitating tacit
collusion. 99
C. Summary
The remedies discussed in this Section are aimed at resolving
problems which arise when consumers are (or believe themselves to be)
locked-in to their current supplier for a non-trivial period of time. The
remedies are aimed at either preventing lock-in; lowering switching
costs; or expanding the number of competitive rival offers.
Throughout the Section we have assumed that search costs are
not so high as to negate any positive incentive to switch. The remedies
discussed in this Section are more effective the lower are search costs
and hence in many cases they need to be combined with other actions,
such as those discussed in Section III, which reduce search costs.
Switching costs can have a detrimental effect on competition. A
remedy which bans identified behavior and actions by firms solely
aimed at making switching technically difficult without offering
counterbalancing benefits to consumers is uncontroversial.
Where switching costs are intangible and consumers appear to
avoid switching even with clear net gains from doing so, behavioral
economics suggests relevant remedies. For example, if consumers suffer
from choice avoidance, a specific remedy aimed at activating such
consumers would require contracts for ongoing services to be renewed
periodically. The renewal notice would activate at least some of these
consumers. Since such a remedy imposes costs on both provider and
customer, a detailed assessment of the remedy in the sector concerned
would be necessary.
Among informational remedies imposed on final markets by the
UK Competition Commission, all but one (Liquid Petroleum Gas2"),
are applied to sectors or industries for which there is a sector specific
regulator. Interventions that help consumers overcome dynamic
switching problems may require more detailed information and more
monitoring, for which only a sector regulator may be efficient.

198

See James Ashton & Robert Watts, Good Payers Face Being Axed By Credit Card Firms,

SUNDAY TIMES, Feb. 3, 2oo8 ("Credit-checking agencies say banks are beginning to weed out

clients with faultless borrowing histories because they can make little profit from them.').
'99 See Section VI.
0 Final Report by CC on "Domestic Bulk Liquefied Petroleum Gas" available at
http:/www.competition-commission.org.uklrep-pub/report/2oo6/5 141pg.htm.
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VI. INTERVENTIONS IN POTENTIALLY COLLUSIVE CONSUMER
MARKETS

When firms interact repeatedly, they can form a tacit
understanding to dampen competition, which may enable them to
maintain higher prices and acquire larger profits than they can when
they compete more intensely. 21 Some remedies that attempt to increase
consumers' ability to shop around can facilitate or undermine this type
of collusive understanding. The purpose of this Section is to consider
the effect of remedies when firms are likely to (or, at least, have the
potential to) act collusively; and to identify the remedies and the
characteristics of markets
where there is a risk of facilitating collusion,
20 2
and where there is not.

In terms of theory, higher prices are sustainable if firms expect
that a short-term benefit from 'deviating' from a collusive
understanding (undercutting a collusive price or expanding output) will
23
be eliminated by a sufficiently harsh long-term response by its rivals. 1
In general, the market structure and industry characteristics affect the
incentives of maintaining the collusive understanding by influencing
the profit from maintaining collusion, the short-term gain of deviating
and the firms' long-term response to a deviation. It is commonly
accepted that firms are more likely to collude in markets with few
firms; high entry barriers; limited product heterogeneity, and, in
general, limited strategies to compete on; high growth rates; cost and
capacity symmetries; and multi-market contact, other things equal.
The main prerequisite for collusion to occur, first discussed by
Stigler, is that firms must have the ability to monitor each other's
behavior.0 4 When there is uncertainty over rivals' actions, a firm may
not respond harshly to a possible deviation, because it will not know for
sure whether a deviation has occurred. As a result, collusion may not be
sustainable, even though the other market characteristics and industry
characteristics are satisfied, because they cannot credibly threaten a
harsh enough punishment to sustain a collusive understanding. Thus,
remedies aimed at increasing information for consumers, which, as a
20 See Mark Ivaldi et al., "The Economics of Tacit Collusion," Final Report for DG
Competition, European Commission (Mar. 2003), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
mergers/studies-reports/the economicsoftacit collusion-en.pdf
(providing
an
in-depth
discussion of the vast collusion literature).
20 We use the term 'collusion' for consistency throughout this Section, which we take to
mean tacit collusion, where firms simply recognise their interdependence and realise that fierce
competition is not in their mutual self-interest. Tacit collusion is distinct from illegal participation
in a cartel through explicit communication to raise prices or restrict output, although both are
modelled in the same way by economic theorists. We focus on tacit collusion because if a
competition authority believes firms have illegally fixed prices, the appropriate remedy is to break
up the cartel, rather than implementing remedies to activate consumers.
20 While terms such as retaliation and punishment are often used in this context, the future
losses may simply arise because firms no longer trust their rivals to keep prices high and hence
adjust their prices downwards on that realisation.
204 George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. OF POL. ECON. 44 (1964).
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side-effect, increase the information about the strategies of rivals, have
the potential to facilitate collusion where this was otherwise not the
case.
A. The Impact Of Interventions In Potentially Collusive Consumer
Markets
In this subsection, we consider interventions in consumer
markets in a very general way: we assume that a remedy can affect the
consumer activity in a market and the ability of firms to monitor each
other's strategies. We shall consider each of these effects in isolation
before turning to the aggregate effect.
Mollgaard and Overgaard show that in a general theoretical
model the effect on prices of increasing consumer activity, other things
equal, is ambiguous. °5 The intuition is that, compared to the status
quo, increased consumer activity provides firms with a greater
incentive to deviate, as a lower price will attract a greater number of its
rivals' more active consumers; but it also strengthens firms' long-term
response, because competition becomes more vigorous with increased
consumer activity. As a result, the collusive understanding may be
undermined if the former effect is greater than the latter.
This has led to a number of theories providing different
predictions of the impact on collusion of consumer activity depending
upon the situation modeled and the assumptions made. For instance,
Schultz shows that price transparency on the consumer side is
unambiguously good for consumers;" 6 Ireland and Waterson show that,
other things equal, search costs can facilitate collusion;.0 . and Farrell
and Klemperer conjecture that switching costs may make it easier for
firms to monitor collusion, because larger price changes are necessary to
attract consumers, which may be easier to observe. 0 8 They also argue
that switching costs may provide focal points that enable the market to
be divided more easily. But, on the other hand, Padilla °9 and Anderson
et a121° suggest that switching costs make collusion difficult to sustain;2 '
205

Per

Baltzer

M0l1gaard

&

H.

Transparency, and Dynamic Oligopoly, in
(ABA, 2009).

Peter

Overgaard,

Information Exchange, Market

2 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 1241

206 Christian Schultz, Transparency on the Consumer Side and Tacit Collusion, 49 EURO.
ECON. REV. 279 (2oo5).
207 Norman Ireland & Michael Waterson, Cartels and Search, The Warwick Economics
Research Paper Series 770, Univ. of Warwick (2006).
208 Farrell & Klemperer, supra note 18.
209 A. Jorge Padilla, Revisiting Dynamic Duopoly with Consumer Switching Costs, 67 J. OF

ECON. THEORY 520 (1995).
210Eric T. Anderson, Nanda Kumar, & Surendra Rajiv, A Comment On: "Revisiting
Dynamic Duopoly With Consumer Switching Costs", 116 J. OF ECON. THEORY 177 (2004).
.. If the switching cost is a type of brand preference or a perceived difference between
heterogeneous products, this result is in accordance with the widely accepted view that less
product substitutability makes collusion easier to sustain, despite the impact of product
substitutability having a similar ambiguous effect on collusion as consumer activity.
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and Mollgaard and Overgaard show that imperfect market
transparency on the consumer side undermines
collusion when there
22
are a limited number of firms in the market.
Recent policy papers by Kfhn 2 3 and OECD 21 4 argue that in

general an increase in consumer activity is likely to make collusion
more difficult to sustain as, according 'to these papers, the short-term
incentive to attract consumers is likely to dominate the long-term
effects of making firms' retaliation harsher. To our knowledge there is
no empirical evidence that tests this conjecture, so more research is
needed to gain a better understanding of the general impact of
increasing consumer activity in a collusive market. Given the lack of
empirical evidence and ambiguous theoretical results, a policymaker
needs to consider the impact on collusion of increased consumer
activity on a market-by-market case. Hereafter, however, we assume
that the above mentioned policy papers are correct and that consumer
activity destabilizes collusion, other things equal.
Turing our attention to whether remedies can improve firms'
ability to monitor each other, Green and Porter consider a theoretical
model which shows how important information is to sustain collusion
and how little information is needed to improve the situation. In their
model, firms face uncertain and unknown market demand, and rivals'
prices and quantities are unobservable. When firms experience low
sales, they are uncertain whether there is low demand in the market or
whether a firm has deviated from the collusive agreement. When this
occurs, firms enter the punishment phase for a certain period as if a
rival has deviated to eliminate any incentive for rivals to deviate in the
future. As a result, the collusive understanding periodically breaks
down because of the lack of information on rivals.
In the above model, when firms can directly observe either their
rivals' prices or output, they are able to observe when a deviation
occurs enabling them to punish deviations and not punish low periods
of market demand, which increases the sustainability of collusion.
Therefore, in situations where firms do not have this information preintervention, publishing firm-specific data on prices or outputs has the
potential to facilitate collusion. Furthermore, firms will be able to infer
whether a rival has deviated if they have information on the level of
total industry demand in the market, as they will be able to tell whether
low sales in a given period are due to low market demand or not, and, if
it is not, it must be due to a deviation. Therefore, publishing
generalized industry-level information could also have the same ability
212 H. Peter M0llgaard & Per Baltzer Overgaard, Market Transparency: A Mixed Blessing?,
Copenhagen Business School & Univ. of Aarhus, CIE Discussion Paper, I999-I5 (1999).
213 Kai-Uwe Kihn, Fighting Collusion by Regulating Communication between Firms, 32
ECON. POL'Y 169 (200 1).
214 OECD,
"Price Transparency," Policy Roundtable, (Paris, 2001), available at

http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/63/2535975.pdf.
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There is some empirical evidence of interventions facilitating
collusive understandings. Albwk et al show that an intervention which
required firms to publish firm-specific transaction prices facilitated
collusion in the Danish ready-mixed concrete market in 1993.216 The
Danish Competition Council published this data to inform buyers of all
prices available in the market, which they believed would increase
consumers' price sensitivity and intensify competition. However,
within one year prices had increased by 15-20 per cent, despite no
evident increase in demand or input prices, or reduction in firms'
capacities. Furthermore, inflation only increased by 1-2 per cent over
the same period. It is argued that the increase in transparency had
inadvertently provided firms with a means of detecting deviations from
a tacit understanding, which enabled them to enforce higher prices.1,
Bringing the two effects together, an intervention that increases
consumer activity and improves firms' ability to monitor each other has
an ambiguous effect on the sustainability of collusion and the outcome
will depend upon the size of the two effects. Therefore, the effect will
vary on a case-by-case basis, so it may need the policymaker to
investigate the possibility of collusion occurring post-intervention. This
is especially necessary when the market structure and industry
characteristics are conducive to collusion. Such an analysis is likely to
be complex as it will be difficult to estimate the effect of an increase in
consumer activity, which is the result of a trade-off (as discussed
above), and it is not clear how to measure how much firms are likely to
benefit from the information. As a result, policymakers should be
cautious when firms' ability to monitor each other is improved and the
market structure is conducive to collusion.
Having said that, when a remedy increases the information
available in a market, it will not always improve firms' ability to
monitor each other's strategies. Colluding firms have an incentive to
monitor rivals' strategies, so it is likely that the firms would possess the
relevant information they need to sustain the collusive understanding
regardless of the intervention. Furthermore, it is likely to be especially
21s In

general, we would expect publication of past and present prices to help firms punish

their rivals for deviation, as in the example above. However, publishing information about future
prices or outputs is not without its problems, as it may assist firms to coordinate on a future
collusive understanding.
216 Svend Albak, Peter M0llgaard, & Per Baltzer Overgaard, Government-Assisted Oligopoly
Coordination?A Concrete Case, 45 J. OF INDUS. ECON. 429 (997).
217 Another example includes Stephen W. Fuller, Fred J.. Ruppel, & David A. Bessler, Effect
of Contract Disclosure on Price: Railroad Grain Contracting in the Plains, i5 W. J. OF AGRIC.
ECON. 265 (i99o). They investigate a natural experiment that occurred in 1986 where contract
disclosure rules were established in the US by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to force
railroads to disclose firm-specific contractual information for freight to prevent larger agriculture
shippers getting more favourable contract offers. They found that, holding constant effects for
demand and supply, shipment characteristics and shipping region, there was a significant upward
trend in the level of freight rates (between io-i5 percent depending upon the region), despite a
significant downward trend before the introduction of the remedy.
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easy for firms in consumer markets to gather the required information
to sustain collusion, as it is usually available (to someone who searches
hard enough). Therefore, it is tempting to conclude that in the majority
of consumer markets implementing an informational remedy will not
improve firms' ability to monitor each other, so collusion should be
undermined.
There are two reasons why this argument may not hold. First,
in some consumer markets it may be difficult for firms to monitor each
other. This is especially likely to occur in markets where consumers
bargain for prices, firms offer confidential price cuts to consumers, or
information on rivals is costly to gather or required frequently. Second,
it may not be common knowledge that all firms possess the required
information to facilitate collusion, so a firm may not expect a
sufficiently harsh retaliation in the event of a deviation. In this
situation, an informational remedy could facilitate collusion by
providing firms with better knowledge about the information set of
their rivals, and so they may expect rivals to respond in a manner to
sustain collusion post-intervention.
B. Collusion and Specific Remedies
Thus far we have considered remedies in a general manner: we
have analyzed the effects of consumer activity and of improving firms'
ability to monitor each other, holding other things constant. For the
remainder of this section, we will consider how the specific remedies
discussed in previous sections can have an impact upon collusion. One
issue that we have not yet addressed is whether an intervention can
facilitate collusion through changing the market structure and industry
characteristics such that collusion is more likely to be facilitated. For
most potential examples, we will not be able to make any definite
predicts as the effects are likely to vary by a case-by-case basis." 8
However, we can consider whether a remedy reduces the number of
strategies that firms can compete on, which is likely to facilitate
collusion.
Table 2 provides a brief summary of whether a specific remedy
can have an effect on the market structure and characteristics in a way
that facilitates collusion, and/or directly improve firms' ability to
monitor each other or not by providing consumers and firms with more
information. Table 2 ignores the possibility of increasing consumer
activity as all of the remedies discussed in this paper (except minimum
standard requirements) directly attempt to increase consumer activity.
This table is presented as a guide and policymakers should consider the
"IR
For instance,

a remedy may lower industry profit and lead firms to exit the market, which

could lead to a market structure with few, symmetric firms left. This may facilitate collusion, but
the possibility of this occurring is likely to depend upon a number of factors that we cannot discuss
in any depth here.
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likely impact upon collusion of a specific remedy on a market-bymarket case, as there may be market-specific effects that cannot be
generalized across markets.
TABLE

2

- How REMEDIES MAY AFFECT COLLUSION

likely to improve
firms' ability to
monitor each other

likely to reduce the
strategies firms compete
on*

unlikely to reduce the
strategies firms compete
on*

* restrictionson nonprice differences
* standarisedpricing
comparisons

o in-store price
comparisons
* price comparison sites
o information provision
of quality
e customer information

____________________portability

unlikely to improve
firms' ability to
monitor each other

* product attribute
portability

cooling-off periods
e cancellationrights
*

*Note: This can include reducing product heterogeneity as well as limiting competition
on pricing structures or innovation.

In table 2 the remedies that are most likely to have the potential
to facilitate collusion are those that are likely to improve firms' ability
to monitor each other. Clearly, in-store price comparisons, price
comparison sites and information provision about quality may enable
firms to become informed about their rivals' strategies more quickly.
Furthermore, customer information portability may provide firms with
the ability to recognize when a rival is encroaching on a core market.
On the other hand, remedies such -as restrictions on non-price
differences and standardized pricing comparisons may make products
less heterogeneous, as well as lower the costs associated with collecting
the necessary information to sustain collusion. Product attribute
portability is unlikely to increase firms' ability to monitor each other,
but it will make products less heterogeneous, as consumers are able to
transfer a valued attribute from firm to firm. The remedies that are
least likely to improve the sustainability of collusion are cooling-off
periods and cancellation rights, as they are unlikely to directly provide
firms with information. However, even these remedies may have the
ability to improve firms' ability to monitor each other if consumers in
turn provide firms with information about better deals.
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VII. CONCLUSION

This paper has presented a number of remedies that can be
used to encourage consumers to play a more active role in finding the
best deal. It has set out the benefits and costs of such remedies, and has
tried to highlight the circumstances in which the remedies are most
likely to succeed.
Of the remedies considered, those that aim to improve
consumer information either directly or indirectly by encouraging more
search appear to be the most powerful. Where consumers enter the
point of sale well informed about the prices and characteristics of the
alternatives on offer in the market, they are more likely to choose the
price-quality combinations which suit them the most. This puts
pressure on firms to deliver what consumers want at competitive prices.
Remedies aimed at protecting the consumer at the point of sale,
other than those already in place as a result of consumer protection
laws, generally seem more costly to administer both for consumers and
any agencies charged with monitoring the remedy. If firms do not
voluntarily offer such remedies, they are likely to resist their
implementation, and costs and prices may be raised.
Remedies to encourage appropriate switching behavior are
distinguished by-their use almost exclusively in industries with specific
sector regulators. This is unlikely to be a coincidence and result partly
from the novelty of choice in some of these markets. The remedies are
all demanding in terms of monitoring and may be difficult to
implement cost effectively without a sector regulator with specialist
knowledge of the industry and a duty to undertake ongoing monitoring.
There is another potential limit to the effectiveness of the
proposed remedies: namely, the fact that consumers' time, attention
and information-processing powers are themselves bounded and/or
their preferences and motivations may be configured differently from
the standard model. This may result in behavior, including responses to
remedies, which is difficult to explain or predict conventionally.
A second concern is that if consumers are fully insured from any
mistakes they may make (whether through inadequate search, bad
judgment or abusive behavior by sellers) their incentives to be active
are severely limited. The more consumers face the full force of a bad
decision, the more they would be expected to take steps to minimize
mistakes and to learn from the past. Where the cost of mistakes and of
learning are not too large, general consumer education to help
consumers help themselves may be more effective than specific
protection measures.
For all the remedies, we considered not only the industrial
economics literature, but also the behavioral economics, marketing and
psychology literatures. Taken as a whole, this literature suggests that
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remedies aimed directly at consumers where both the problem and the
remedy are easy to understand will be the most effective. It also
suggests that incentivizing firms to communicate relevant information
to consumer, and supporting them in these activities, may be more
powerful than direct remedies.
Increasing transparency in the market may not just help
consumers to make markets work better, but also help firms to soften
competition by facilitating tacit collusion. Section VI in particular
provides examples of where this has occurred in practice.
A. Future Research Needs
This survey has identified where knowledge and understanding
is slight and where more work is needed. For some of the remedies
discussed in this paper, robust theoretical analysis backed with
sophisticated empirical evidence enable a clear assessment of their
likely impact. For other remedies, more research is needed.
While the theoretical analysis is far ahead of empirical research,
there remain gaps in theoretical understanding of a number of the
remedies considered in this paper. In particular, better models of
behavior at the point of sale would strengthen our understanding of the
proposed remedies.
The paucity of empirical evidence is more- pronounced. More
work on the effect of standardization, of price comparisons (whether on
the web or in the store) of comparative advertising and of post sale
remedies is particularly needed. For some remedies empirical evidence
exists, but only from a few industries. Robust evidence of the effects of
the remedies across industries, countries and time is also lacking. The
biggest hurdle to such empirical work is posed by access to appropriate
date. To assess the remedies, the researcher would need data from
before and after the deployment of a remedy. While getting the "before"
data is a particular challenge because it is difficult to foresee when a
remedy will be imposed, Competition Authorities are in a unique
position to gather data whose analysis can provide evidence to improve
their own future policy interventions.

